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Abstract
We study a two-sector general equilibrium model of housing and non-housing production
where heterogenous households face limited opportunities to insure against aggregate and
idiosyncratic risks. The model generates large variability in the national house price-rent
ratio, both because it uctuates endogenously with the state of the economy and because it
rises in response to a relaxation of credit constraints and decline in housing transaction costs
(nancial market liberalization). These factors, together with a rise in foreign ownership of
U.S. debt calibrated to match the actual increase over the period 2000-2006, generate an
increase in the model price-rent ratio comparable to that observed in U.S. data over this
period. The model also predicts a sharp decline in home prices starting in 2007, driven by
the economic contraction and by a presumed reversal of the nancial market liberalization.
Fluctuations in the models price-rent ratio are driven by changing risk premia, which uc-
tuate endogenously in response to cyclical shocks, the nancial market liberalization, and its
subsequent reversal. By contrast, we show that the inow of foreign money into domestic
bond markets plays a small role in driving home prices, despite its large depressing inuence
on interest rates. Finally, the model implies that procyclical increases in equilibrium price-
rent ratios reect rational expectations of lower future housing returns, not higher future
rents.
JEL: G11, G12, E44, E21
ruary 2010, and the Utah Winter Finance Conference February 2010 for helpful comments. Any errors or
omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
1 Introduction
Residential real estate is a large and volatile component of household wealth. Moreover,
volatility in housing wealth is often accompanied by large swings in house prices relative to
housing fundamentals. For example, Figure 1 shows that national house price-rent ratios
climbed to unusual heights by the end of 2006, but have since exhibited sharp declines.
This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of uctuations in housing wealth
and housing nance. To what extent can episodes of national house price appreciation be
attributed to a liberalization in housing nance, such as declines in collateral constraints or
reductions in the costs of borrowing and conducting transactions? How do movements in
house prices a¤ect expectations about future housing fundamentals and future home price
appreciation? To what extent do changes in housing wealth and housing nance a¤ect output
and investment, risk premia in housing and equity markets, measures of cross-sectional risk-
sharing, and life-cycle patterns in wealth accumulation and savings?
In this paper we address these questions by studying a two-sector general equilibrium
model of housing and non-housing production where heterogenous households face limited
risk-sharing opportunities as a result of incomplete nancial markets. The goal of this
research is to provide theoretical answers to the questions posed above using a model that
is su¢ ciently general as to account for the endogenous interactions among nancial and
housing wealth, output and investment, rates of return and risk premia in both housing and
equity assets, and consumption and wealth inequality.
A house in our model is a residential durable asset that provides utility to the household,
is illiquid (expensive to trade), and can be used as collateral in debt obligations. The model
economy is populated by a large number of overlapping generations of households who receive
utility from both housing and nonhousing consumption and who face a stochastic life-cycle
earnings prole. We introduce market incompleteness by modeling heterogeneous agents
who face idiosyncratic and aggregate risks against which they cannot perfectly insure, and
by imposing collateralized borrowing constraints on households.
Within the context of this model, we focus our theoretical investigation on the macroeco-
nomic consequences of three systemic changes in housing nance. First, we investigate the
impact of changes in housing collateral requirements. Second, we investigate the impact of
changes in housing transactions costs. Third, we investigate the impact of an inux of for-
eign capital into the domestic bond market. We argue below that all three factors uctuate
over time and changed markedly during or preceding the period of rapid home price appre-
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ciation from 2000-2006. In particular, this period was marked by a widespread relaxation of
collateralized borrowing constraints and declining housing transactions costs, a combination
we refer to hereafter as nancial market liberalization. The period was also marked by a
sustained depression of long-term interest rates that coincided with a vast inow of capital
from foreign governmental holders into U.S. bond markets. In the aftermath of the credit
crisis that began in 2007, the erosion in credit standards and transactions costs has been
reversed.1 We use our framework as a laboratory for studying the impact of uctuations in
either direction of these features of housing nance.
We summarize the models main implications as follows.
House prices relative to measures of fundamental value are volatile. The model
generates substantial variability in the national house price-rent ratio, both because it uc-
tuates procyclically with the state of the economy, and because it rises in response to a
relaxation of credit constraints and decline in housing transaction costs. When we combine
a nancial market liberalization with an inow of foreign capital into the domestic bond
market calibrated to match the rise in foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury and agency debt
over the period 2000-2006, the model generates an increase in the price-rent ratio comparable
to that observed in U.S. data from 2000-2006. The model also predicts a sharp decline in
home prices starting in 2007, driven by the economic contraction and by a presumed reversal
of the nancial market liberalization (but not the foreign capital inow).
A nancial market liberalization drives price-rent ratios up because it drives
risk premia down. The main impetus for rising price-rent ratios in the model is the
simultaneous occurrence of positive economic shocks and a nancial market liberalization,
phenomena that generate an endogenous decline in risk premia on housing and equity assets.
A nancial market liberalization reduces risk premia for two reasons, both of which are re-
lated to the ability of heterogeneous households to insure against aggregate and idiosyncratic
risks. First, lower collateral requirements directly increase access to credit, which acts as
a bu¤er against unexpected income declines. Second, lower transactions costs reduce the
expense of obtaining the collateral required to increase borrowing capacity and provide in-
surance. These factors lead to an increase in risk-sharing, or a decrease in the cross-sectional
variance of marginal utility.
It is important to note that the rise in price-rent ratios caused by a nancial market
liberalization must be attributed to a decline in risk premia and not to a fall in interest rates.
1Some analysts have argued that, since the credit crisis, borrowing restrictions and credit constraints
have become even more stringent than historical norms in the pre-boom period (e.g., Streitfeld (2009)).
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Indeed, the very changes in housing nance that accompany a nancial market liberalization
drive the endogenous interest rate up, rather than down. It follows that price-rent ratios rise
after a nancial market liberalization because the decline in risk premia more than o¤sets the
rise in equilibrium interest rates. These ndings underscore the crucial role of foreign capital
in maintaining low interest rates during a nancial market liberalization. Without an infusion
of foreign capital, any period of looser collateral requirements and lower housing transactions
costs (such as that which characterized the period of rapid home price appreciation from
2000-2006) would be accompanied by an increase in equilibrium interest rates, as households
endogenously respond to the improved risk-sharing opportunities a¤orded by a nancial
market liberalization by reducing precautionary saving.
Foreign purchases of U.S. bonds play a central role in lower interest rates but
a small role in housing booms. The model implies that a rise in foreign purchases of
domestic bonds, equal in magnitude to those observed in the data from 2000-2006, leads
to a quantitatively large decline in the equilibrium real interest rate. In partial equilibrium
analyses where risk premia are held xed, a decline in the interest rate of this magnitude
would be su¢ cientby itselfto explain the rise in price-rent ratios observed from 2000-2006.
But we show that, in general equilibrium, borrowed sums from the rest of the world can play
at most a limited role in asset booms, despite their large depressing inuence on interest
rates. Foreign purchases of U.S. bonds crowd domestic savers out of the safe bond market,
exposing them to greater systematic risk in equity and housing markets. In response, risk
premia on housing and equity assets rise, substantially o¤setting the lower interest rates and
limiting the impact of foreign capital inows on home prices.
Procyclical increases in equilibrium price-rent ratios reect rational expecta-
tions of lower future returns, not higher future rents. It is commonly assumed that
increases in national house-price rent ratios reect an expected increase in future housing
fundamentals, such as rental growth. In partial equilibrium analyses where discount rates
are held constant, this is the only outcome possible (e.g., Sinai and Souleles (2005), Camp-
bell and Cocco (2007)). This reasoning, however, ignores the general equilibrium response of
both residential investment and discount rates to economic growth. In the model here, pos-
itive economic shocks stimulate greater housing demand and greater residential investment.
Under plausible parameterizations, the latter can lead to an equilibrium decline in future
rental growth as the housing stock rises. It follows that high price-rent ratios in expansions
must entirely reect expectations of future house price depreciation (lower discount rates),
driven in the model by falling risk premia as collateral values and risk-sharing opportunities
3
rise with the economy.
Financial market liberalization plus foreign capital leads to a shift in the com-
position of wealth towards housing, increases nancial wealth inequality, but has
ambiguous e¤ects on consumption inequality. A nancial market liberalization plus
an inow of foreign capital into the domestic bond market leads households of all ages and
incomes to shift the composition of their wealth towards housing, consistent with observed
changes in household-level data from 2000 to 2007. These factors also have implications for
inequality. Although a nancial market liberalization improves risk sharing and drives risk
premia down, an inow of foreign governmental capital into the safe bond market reduces
risk sharing because it increases the exposure of domestic savers to risky asset markets. We
show that a nancial market liberalization and foreign capital infusion have o¤setting e¤ects
on consumption inequality but reinforcing upward e¤ects on nancial wealth inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. The next subsection briey discusses related literature.
Section 2 describes recent changes in the three key aspects of housing nance discussed
above: collateral constraints, housing transactions costs, and foreign capital in U.S. debt
markets. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 presents our main ndings,
including benchmark business cycle and nancial market statistics. Here we show that the
model generates forecastable variation in equity and housing returns, and a sizable equity
premium and Sharpe ratio simultaneously with a plausible degree of variability in aggregate
consumption. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a growing body of literature in nance that studies the asset pricing
implications of incomplete markets models. The focus of this literature, however, is typically
on the equity market implications of pure exchange economies with exogenous endowments,
with no role for housing or the production side of the economy.2 Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2007), Gomes and Michaelides (2008), and Favilukis (2008) explicitly model the
production side of the economy, but focus on single-sector economies without housing.
Within the incomplete markets environment, our work is related to several papers that
study questions related to housing and/or consumer durables more generally. These papers
typically either do not model production (instead studying a pure exchange economy), and/or
2See for example Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994), Heaton and Lucas (1996),
Basak and Cuoco (1998), Luttmer (1999)), for a study of single sector exchange economies, or Lustig and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) for a two-sector exchange economy model.
4
the portfolio choice problem underlying asset allocation between a risky and a risk-free asset,
or are analyses of partial equilibrium environments. See for example, the general equilibrium
exchange-economy analyses that embed bond, stock and housing markets of Ríos-Rull and
Sánchez-Marcos (2006), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007, 2008), Piazzesi and Schneider
(2008), and the partial equilibrium analyses of Peterson (2006), Ortalo-Magné and Rady
(2006), and Corbae and Quintin (2009).
Other researchers have studied the role of incomplete markets in housing decisions in
models without aggregate risk. Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) study how con-
sumption over the life-cycle is inuenced by consumer durables in an incomplete markets
model with production, but limit their focus to equilibria in which prices, wages and interest
rates are constant over time. Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2008) study a life-cycle
model with housing and non-housing production, but focus their analysis on the perfect
foresight equilibria of an economy without aggregate risk and an exogenous interest rate.
One recent analysis that does combine aggregate risk, production, and incomplete markets
is Iacoviello and Pavan (2009). These authors study the role of housing and debt for the
volatility of the aggregate economy in a model with a single production and single saving
technology. Because there is no risk-free asset, however, their model is silent about the role
of risk premia in the economy, a central focus of our paper.
Outside of the incomplete markets environment, a strand of the macroeconomic literature
studies housing behavior in a two-sector, general equilibrium business cycle framework either
with production (e.g., Davis and Heathcote (2005), Kahn (2008)) or without production
(e.g., Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007)). The focus in these papers is on environments
with complete markets for idiosyncratic risks and a representative agent representation.
These models are silent on questions involving risk-sharing, inequality, and age and income
heterogeneity.
It is important to note that our paper does not address the question of why credit mar-
ket conditions changed so markedly in recent decades (we discuss this in the conclusion).
It is widely understood that the nancial market liberalization we study was preceded by
a number of revolutionary changes in housing nance, notably by the rise in securitization.
These changes initially decreased the risk of individual home mortgages and home equity
loans, allowing for a more e¢ cient allocation of risk and, some have argued, making it opti-
mal for lending contracts to feature lower collateral requirements and housing transactions
fees (e.g. Green and Wachter (2008); Piskorski and Tchistyi (2008); Strongin, ONeill, Him-
melberg, Hindian, and Lawson (2009)). As these researchers note, however, these initially
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risk-reducing changes in housing nance were accompanied by government deregulation of
nancial institutions that ultimately increased risk, by permitting such institutions to al-
ter the composition of their assets towards more high-risk securities, by permitting higher
leverage ratios, and by presiding over the spread of complex nancial holding companies
that replaced the long-standing separation between investment bank, commercial bank and
insurance company. Industry analysis suggests that the markets subsequent revised ex-
pectation upward of the riskiness of the underlying mortgage assets since 2007 has led to
a reversal in collateral requirements and transactions fees. It is precisely these changes in
credit conditions that are a focus of this study.
2 Changes in Housing Finance
This section documents the empirical relevance of changes in three features of housing -
nance. First are changes in collateralized borrowing requirements, broadly dened. Collater-
alized borrowing constraints can take the form of an explicit down payment requirement for
new home purchases, but they also apply to home equity borrowing. Recent data suggests
that down payment requirements for a range of mortgage categories declined during or pre-
ceding the period of rapid home price appreciation from 2000 to 2006. Loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios on subprime loans rose from 79% to 86% over the period 2001-2005, while debt-income
ratios rose (Demyanyk and Hemert (2008)). Other reports suggest that the increase LTV
ratios for prime mortgages was even greater, with one industry analysis nding that LTV
ratios for conforming rst and second mortgages rose from 60.4% in 2002 to 75.2% in 2006.3
These changes coincided with a surge in borrowing against existing home equity between
2002 and 2006 (Mian and Su (2009b)).
More generally, there was a widespread relaxation of underwriting standards in the U.S.
mortgage market during the period leading up to the credit crisis of 2007, which provide a
back-door means of reducing collateral requirements for home purchases. The loosening of
standards can be observed in the marked rise in simultaneous second-lien mortgages and in
no-documentation or low-documentation loans.4 By the end of 2006 households routinely
bought homes with 100% nancing using a piggyback second mortgage or home equity loan.
3Source: UBS, April 16, 2007 Lunch and Learn, How Did We Get Here and What Lies Ahead,Thomas
Zimmerman, page 5.
4FDIC Outlook: Breaking New Ground in U.S. Mortgage Lending, December 18, 2006.
<http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20062q/na/2006_summer04.html#10A>.
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See also Mian and Su (2009a). Loans for 125% of the home value were even available if the
borrower used the top 25% to pay o¤ existing debt. Industry analysts indicate that LTV
ratios for combined (rst and second) mortgages have since returned to more normal levels
of no greater than 75-80% of the appraised value of the home. We assess the impact of these
changes collectively by modeling them as a reduction in collateralized borrowing constraints
and subsequent rise.
Second in our study of housing nance are transactions costs. The period of rapid home
price appreciation was marked by a decline in the cost of conducting housing transactions;
houses, in e¤ect, became more liquid. Closing costs for mortgages, mortgage renancing,
and home equity extraction all fell sharply in the years during and preceding the housing
boom that ended in 2006. The Federal Housing Financing Board reports monthly data on
mortgage and mortgage renancing closing costs (based on a survey of the largest lenders).
Figure 2 shows closing costs on rst mortgages and mortgage renancings combined. These
costs declined from 2.70% of the loan balance in January 1985 to 0.46% in April 2008.
Expressed as an interest rate, these costs decline 90%, from 50 basis points to 5 basis points
over the period 1985-2007. For Freddie Mac 30-year conforming mortgages, the same closing
costs declined 83% over this period, 40% from the end of 2000 to end of 2006. These costs
began moving back up in the aftermath of the credit crisis of 2007/2008. From 2007 to 2009,
closing costs on Freddie Mac 30-year conforming mortgages surged back up 56%.
Researchers focusing on subprime borrowing have documented sharp declines in housing
transactions costs during or proceeding the housing boom. Berndt, Hollield, and Sandas
(2010) use data from New Century Financial Corporation, a large subprime mortgage lender
from 1996 until 2006. Their Table 2 shows that the broker fees paid by subprime mortgage
borrowers declined 52% from 1997-2006 and 48% from 2000-2006. Moreover, these declines
are uniform across loan types (xed rate mortgages with and without full documentation,
hybrid loans with and without documentation), suggesting that comparable reductions in
transactions costs were present for other mortgage categories.
Finally, transactions costs associated with home equity extraction declined signicantly
and coincided with a surge of 350% in mortgage equity withdrawal rates from 2000-2006.5
Kennedy and Greenspan (2007) compiled data on closing costs for home equity loans (HEL)
and home equity lines of credit (HELOC) from periodic releases of the Home Equity Survey
Report, published by the American Bankers Association. The data indicate that these costs
5Figures based on updated estimates provided by James Kennedy of the mortgage analysis in Kennedy
and Greenspan (2005).
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trended down signicantly: for HELOCs, they were 76% lower in 2004 than they were in
1988. For closed-end HELs, the costs declined 41% from 1998 to 2004. The surveys indicate
that non-pecuniary costs, in the form of required documentation, time lapsed from loan
application to loan closing, and familiarity with available opportunities for renancing and
home-equity extraction, also declined substantially.
Third in our study of housing nance are foreign purchases of U.S. assets. A key devel-
opment in the housing market in recent years is the secular decline in interest rates, which
coincided with a surge in foreign ownership of U.S. bonds. Figure 3 shows that both 30-year
FRMs and the 10-year Treasury bond yield have trended downward, with mortgage rates
declining from around 18 percent in the early 1980s to near 6 percent by the end of 2007.
This was not merely attributable to a decline in ination: the real annual interest rate on
the ten-year Treasury bond fell from 3.6% in 2000 to 0.93% in 2006 using the consumer price
index as a measure of ination. At the same time, foreign ownership of U.S. Treasuries (T-
bonds and T-notes) increased from $118 billion in 1984, or 13.5% of marketable Treasuries
outstanding, to $2.2 trillion in 2008, or 61% of marketable Treasuries (Figure 4, Panel A).
Foreign holdings of U.S. agency and Government Sponsored Enterprise-backed agency secu-
rities quintupled between 2000 and 2007, rising from $261 billion to $1.3 trillion, or from 7%
to 21% of total agency debt. Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury and Agency debt as a fraction
of GDP more than doubled from 14% to 30% over the period 2000-2006 (Figure 4, Panel
B). By pushing real interest rates lower, the rise in foreign capital has been directly linked
to the surge in mortgage originations over this period (e.g., Strongin, ONeill, Himmelberg,
Hindian, and Lawson (2009)). Economic policymakers, such as Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke, have also emphasized the role of foreign capital in driving interest rates lower
and in fueling house price ination.6
In the model, interest rates are determined in equilibrium by a market clearing condition
for bondholders. We consider one specication of the model in which we introduce an
exogenous foreign demand for domestic bonds into the market clearing condition, referred
to hereafter as foreign capital. This foreign capital is modeled as owned by governmental
holders who place all of their funds in domestic riskless bonds. We do this for two reasons.
First, by the end of 2008, Foreign O¢ cial Institutions held 70% of all foreign holdings of
U.S. Treasuries. Moreover, as explained in Kohn (2002), government entities have specic
6For example, see remarks by then Governor Ben S. Bernanke at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Associ-
ation of Economics, Richmond, Virginia, March 10, 2005, and by Chairman Bernanke, at the International
Monetary Conference, Barcelona, Spain (via satellite), June 3, 2008.
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regulatory and reserve currency motives for holding U.S. Treasuries and face both legal and
political restrictions on the type of assets that can be held, forcing them into safe securities.
Second, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) nd that demand for U.S. Treasury
securities by governmental holders is extremely inelastic, implying that when these holders
receive funds to invest they buy U.S. Treasuries, regardless of their price relative to other U.S.
assets. This motivates our modeling of foreign capital as both exogenous and as restricted to
investments in the safe asset. In the model, we assume domestic borrowers may obtain credit
at a xed interest rate spread with the governmental rate. Because our model abstracts from
default, we set this spread to zero in our calibration.
3 The Model
3.1 Firms
The production side of the economy consists of two sectors. One sector produces the non-
housing consumption good, and the other sector produces the housing good. We refer to the
rst as the consumption sectorand the second as the housing sector.Time is discrete
and each period corresponds to a year. In each period, a representative rm in each sector
chooses labor (which it rents) and investment in capital (which it owns) to maximize the
value of the rm to its owners.
3.1.1 Consumption Sector
Denote output in the consumption sector as
YC;t  ZC;tKC;tN1 C;t
where ZC;t is the stochastic productivity level at time t, KC is the capital stock in the
consumption sector,  is the share of capital, and NC is the quantity of labor input in the
consumption sector. Let IC denote investment in the consumption sector. The rms capital
stock KC;t accumulates over time subject to proportional adjustment costs, C

IC;t
KC;t

KC;t,
modeled as a deduction from the earnings of the rm. The rm maximizes the present
discounted value VC;t of a stream of earnings:
VC;t = max
NC;t;IC;t
Et
1X
k=0
kt+k
t

YC;t+k   wt+kNC;t+k   IC;t+k   C

IC;t+k
KC;t+k

KC;t+k

; (1)
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where 
kt+k
t
is a stochastic discount factor discussed below, and wt is the wage rate (equal
across sectors in equilibrium). The evolution equation for the rms capital stock is
KC;t+1 = (1  )KC;t + IC;t;
where  is the depreciation rate of the capital stock.
The rm does not issue new shares and nances its capital stock entirely through retained
earnings. The dividends to shareholders are equal to
DC;t = YC;t   wtNC;t   IC;t   C

IC;t
KC;t

KC;t:
3.1.2 Housing Sector
The housing rms problem is analogous to the problem solved by the representative rm in
the consumption sector, except that, in our most general specication, housing production
utilizes an additional xed factor of production, Lt, representing a combination of land and
government permits for residential construction.7 Denote output in the residential housing
sector as
YH;t = ZH;t (Lt)1 
 
KH;tN
1 
H;t

;
YH;t represents construction of new housing (residential investment), 1    is the share
of land/permits in housing production, and  is the share of capital in the construction
component
 
KH;tN
1 
H;t

of housing production. Variables denoted with an Hsubscript are
dened exactly as above for the consumption sector but now pertain to the housing sector,
e.g., ZH;t denotes the stochastic productivity level in the housing sector.
Below we consider two specications for the role of land/permits, including a baseline
specication that sets their share in housing production to zero, or  = 1. For the specica-
tion in which land/permits have a non-zero share ( < 1), we assume that, each period, the
government makes available a xed supply L of land/permits for residential construction by
renting them at the competitive rental rate equal to the marginal product of Lt. The proceeds
from land rentals are used by the government to nance (wasteful) government spending Gt.
When a house is sold, the government issues a transferable lease for the land/permits in
perpetuity at no charge to the homeowner. This implies that, for all practical purposes,
the buyer of the home operates as owner even though, by eminent domain, the government
retains the legal right to the land/permits.
7Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005) argue that the increasing value of land for residential development
is tied to government-issued construction permits, rather than to the acreage itself.
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The housing rm maximizes
VH;t = max
NH;t;IH;t
Et
1X
k=0
kt+k
t
0@ pHt+kYH;t+k   pLt+kLt+k   wt+kNH;t+k
 IH;t+k   H

IH;t+k
KH;t+k

KH;t+k
1A ; (2)
where pHt+k is the relative price of one unit of housing in units of the non-housing consumption
good and pLt+k is the price of land/permits. Note that p
H
t is the time t price of a unit of
housing of xed quality and quantity. The dividends to shareholders in the housing sector
are denoted
DH;t = p
H
t YH;t   pLt+kLt   wtNH;t   IH;t   H

IH;t
KH;t

KH;t:
Capital in the housing sector evolves:
KH;t+1 = (1  )KH;t + IH;t:
Note that YH;t represents residential construction; thus the law of motion for the aggregate
residential housing stock Ht is
Ht+1 = (1  H)Ht + YH;t;
where H denotes the depreciation rate of the housing stock.
3.2 Risky Asset Returns
The rmsvalues VH;t and VC;t are the cum dividend values, measured before the dividend
is paid out. Thus the cum dividend returns to shareholders in the housing sector and the
consumption sector are dened, respectively, as
RYH ;t+1 =
VH;t+1
(VH;t  DH;t) RYC ;t+1 =
VC;t+1
(VC;t  DC;t) :
We dene V ej;t = Vj;t  Dj;t for j = H;C to be the ex dividend value of the rm.8
3.3 Individuals
The economy is populated by A overlapping generations of individuals, indexed by a =
1; :::; A; with a continuum of individuals born each period. Individuals live through two
8Using the ex dividend value of the rm the return reduces to the more familiar ex dividend denition:
Rej;t+1 =
V ej;t+1+Dj;t+1
V ej;t
:
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stages of life, a working stage and a retirement stage. Adult age begins at age 21, so a equals
this e¤ective age minus 20. Agents live for a maximum of A = 80 (100 years). Workers
live from age 21 (a = 1) to 65 (a = 45) and then retire. Retired workers die with an age-
dependent probability calibrated from life expectancy data. The probability that an agent
is alive at age a + 1 conditional on being alive at age a is denoted a+1ja. Upon death, any
remaining net worth of the individual in that period is counted as terminal consumption,
e.g., funeral and medical expenses.
Individuals have an intraperiod utility function given by
U(Ca;t; Ha;t) =
eC1  1a;t
1  1

eCa;t = hC " 1"a;t + (1  )H " 1"a;t i "" 1 ;
where Ca;t is non-housing consumption of an individual of age a, and Ha;t is the stock
of housing,  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion,  is the relative weight on non-
housing consumption in utility, and " is the constant elasticity of substitution between C
and H. Implicit in this specication is the assumption that the service ow from houses is
proportional to the stock Ha;t.
Financial market trade is limited to a one-period riskless bond and to risky capital, where
the latter is restricted to be a mutual fund of equity in the housing and consumption sectors.
The mutual fund is a value-weighted portfolio with return
RK;t+1 =
V eH;t
V eH;t + V
e
C;t
RYH ;t+1 +
V eC;t
V eH;t + V
e
C;t
RYC ;t+1: (3)
The gross bond return is denoted Rf;t = 1qt 1 , where qt 1 is the bond price known at time
t  1. Individuals are born with no initial endowment of risky capital or bonds.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their labor productivity. To denote this heterogeneity, we
index individuals i. Before retirement households supply labor inelastically. The stochastic
process for individual income for workers is
Y ia;t = wtL
i
a;t;
where Lia;t is the individuals labor endowment (hours times an individual-specic produc-
tivity factor), and wt is the aggregate wage per unit of productivity. Labor productivity is
specied by a deterministic age-specic prole, Ga, and an individual shock Zia;t:
Lia;t = GaZ
i
t
log
 
Zit

= log
 
Zit 1

+ it; 
i
t  i:i:d:
 
0; 2t

;
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where Ga is a deterministic function of age capturing a hump-shaped prole in life-cycle
earnings and ia;t is a stochastic i.i.d. shock to individual earnings. To capture countercyclical
variation in idiosyncratic risk of the type documented by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(2004), we use a two-state specication for the variance of idiosyncratic earnings shocks:
2t =
(
2E if ZC;t  E (ZC;t)
2R if ZC;t < E (ZC;t)
; 2R > 
2
E (4)
This specication implies that the variance of idiosyncratic labor earnings is higher in re-
cessions(ZC;t  E (ZC;t)) than in expansions(ZC;t  E (ZC;t)). The former is denoted
with an Rsubscript, the latter with an Esubscript. Finally, labor earnings are taxed
at rate  in order to nance social security retirement income.
At age a, agents enter the period with wealth invested in bonds, Bia, and shares 
i
a of
risky capital. The total number of shares outstanding of the risky asset is normalized to
unity. We rule out short-sales in the risky asset,
ia;t  0: (5)
An individual who chooses to invest in the mutual fund pays a xed, per-period participation
cost, FK;t.
We assume that the housing owned by each individual depreciates at rate H ; the rate of
depreciation of the aggregate housing stock. Households may choose to increase the quantity
of housing consumed at time t + 1 by making a net investment H ia;t+1   (1  H)H ia;t > 0.
Because houses are illiquid, it is expensive to change housing consumption. An individual
who chooses to change housing consumption pays a transaction cost F iH;t. Denote the sum
of the per period equity participation cost and housing transaction cost for individual i as
F it  F iH;t + FK;t:
Dene the individuals gross nancial wealth at time t as
W ia;t  ia;t
 
V eC;t + V
e
H;t +DC;t +DH;t

+Bia;t:
The budget constraint for an agent of age a who is not retired is
Cia;t +B
i
a+1;t+1qt + 
i
a+1;t+1
 
V eC;t + V
e
H;t
  W ia;t + (1  )wtLia;t (6)
+pHt
 
(1  H)H ia;t  H ia+1;t+1
  F it
W ia+1;t+1    (1 $) pHt H ia;t+1; 8a; t (7)
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where  is a social security tax rate and where
F iH;t =

0; H ia+1;t+1 = (1  H)H ia;t
 0 +  1p
H
t H
i
a;t; H
i
a+1;t+1 6= (1  H)H ia;t
:
FK;t =
(
0 if ia+1;t+1 = 0
F if ia+1;t+1 > 0
:
F iH;t is the housing transactions cost which contains both a xed and variable component
and depends on age only through H ia;t. Equation (7) is the collateral constraint, where
0  $  1. It says that households may borrow no more than a fraction (1 $) of the
value of housing, implying that they must post collateral equal to a fraction $ of the value
of the house. This constraint can be thought of as a down-payment constraint for new
home purchases, but it also encompasses collateral requirements for home equity borrowing
against existing homes. The constraint gives the maximum combined LTV ratio for rst and
second mortgages and home equity withdrawal. Notice that if the price pHt of the house rises
and nothing else changes, the individual can nance a greater level of consumption of both
housing and nonhousing goods and services.
Two points about the collateral constraint above are worth noting. First, it applies to
any borrowing against home equity, not just to mortgages. Second, borrowing takes place
using one-period debt. Thus, an individuals borrowing capacity uctuates period-by-period
with the value of the house.
We also prevent individuals from buying stock on margin. If the individual is a net
borrower, this means we restrict holdings of the risky asset to be zero, ia+1;t+1 = 0. This
restriction is stated mathematically as follows:
if W ia;t + (1  )wtLia;t  
 
Cia;t + p
H
t
 
H ia+1;t+1   (1  H)H ia;t
  F it  < 0 (8)
then Bia+1;t+1 < 0; 
i
a+1;t+1 = 0:
Net lenders may take a positive position in the risky asset but may not short the bond to
do so:
if W ia;t + (1  )wtLia;t  
 
Cia;t + p
H
t
 
H ia+1;t+1   (1  H)H ia;t
  F it   0 (9)
then Bia+1;t+1  0; ia+1;t+1  0:
Let Ziar denote the value of the stochastic component of individual labor productivity,
Zia;t, during the last year of working life. Each period, retired workers receive a government
pension PEia;t = Z
i
arXt where Xt = 
NW
NR
is the pension determined by a pay as you go
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system, and NW and NR are the numbers of working age and retired households.9 For agents
who have reached retirement age, the budget constraint is identical to that for workers (6)
except that wage income (1  )wtLia;t is replaced by pension income PEia;t.
Let Zt  (ZC;t; ZH;t)0 denote the aggregate shocks. The state of the economy is a pair,
(Z; ) ; where  is a measure dened over S =(AZ W H), where A = f1; 2; :::Ag is
the set of ages, where Z is the set of all possible idiosyncratic shocks, where W is the set
of all possible beginning-of-period nancial wealth realizations, and where H is the set of
all possible beginning-of-period housing wealth realizations. That is,  is a distribution
of agents across ages, idiosyncratic shocks, nancial and housing wealth. The presence of
aggregate shocks implies that  evolves stochastically over time. We specify a law of motion,
 ; for ;
t+1 =   (t; Zt; Zt+1) :
3.4 Stochastic Discount Factor
The stochastic discount factor (SDF), t+1
t
, appears in the dynamic value maximization
problem (1) and (2) undertaken by each representative rm. As a consequence of our in-
complete markets setting, a question arises about how to model t+1
t
. For example, the
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (MRS) of any shareholder in this setting is a
valid stochastic discount factor. Much of the existing literature has avoided this ambiguity
about the SDF by assuming that rms rent capital from households on a period-by-period
basis, thereby solving a series of static optimization problems. Since the problem is static,
the question of discounting is then mute. In this static case, however, one needs to impose
some other form of exogenous shock, for example stochastic depreciation in the rented cap-
ital stocks (e.g., Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007), Gomes and Michaelides (2008)),
in order to make the volatility of the equity return realistic. Here we instead keep depre-
ciation deterministic and model dynamic rms that own capital and face adjustment costs
when changing their capital stocks, requiring us to take a stand on the SDF. We do this
for several reasons. First, in our own experimentation we found that the amount of sto-
chastic depreciation required to achieve reasonable levels of stock market volatility produced
9The decomposition of the population into workers and retirees is determined from life-expectancy tables
as follows. Let X denote the total number of people born each period. (In practice this is calibrated to
be a large number in order to approximate a continuum.) Then NW = 45  X is the total number of
workers. Next, from life expectancy tables, if the probability of dying at age a > 45 is denoted pa then
NR =
P80
a=46 (1  pa)X is the total number of retired persons.
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excessive volatility in investment. Second, it is di¢ cult to know what amount of stochastic
depreciation, if any, is reasonable. Third, an economy populated entirely of static rms is
unrealistic. In the real world, rms own their own capital stocks and must think dynamically
about shareholder value.
For these reasons, we assume that the representative rm in each sector solves the dy-
namic problem presented above and discount future prots using a weighted average of the
individual shareholdersMRS in non-housing consumption,
@U=@Cia+1;t+1
@U=@Cia;t
, where the weights,
ia;t, correspond to the shareholders proportional ownership in the rm. Let
t+1
t
denote
this weighted average. Recalling that the total number of shares in the risky portfolio is
normalized to unity, we have
t+1
t

Z
S
ia+1;t+1
@U=@Cia+1;t+1
@U=@Cia;t
d (10)
@U=@Cia+1;t+1
@U=@Cia;t
= 
26664

Cia+1;t+1
Cia;t
  1

2664+ (1  )

Hia+1;t+1
Cia+1;t+1
 " 1
"
+ (1  )

Hia;t
Cia;t
 " 1
"
3775
 "
(" 1)
37775 : (11)
Since we weight each individuals MRS by its proportional ownership (and since short-
sales in the risky asset are prohibited), only those households who have taken a positive
position in the risky asset (shareholders) will receive non-zero weight in the SDF.
Although this specication of the stochastic discount factor leads to an equilibrium that
depends on the control of the rm being xed according to the proportional ownership
structure described above, it is not necessarily quantitatively sensitive to this assumption on
ownership control. For example, Carceles Poveda and Coen-Pirani (2009) show that, given
the rms objective of value maximization, the equilibrium allocations in their incomplete
markets models are invariant to the choice of stochastic discount factor within the set that
includes the MRS of any household (or any weighted average of these) for whom the Euler
equation for the risky asset return is satised. They show in addition that the equilibrium
allocations of such economies are the same as the allocations obtained in otherwise identi-
cal economies with staticrms that rent capital from households on a period-by-period
basis. Although these results have been formally proved only in an environment without
adjustment costs, we note that our calibration of adjustment costs (discussed below) makes
them quantitatively small, amounting to less than one percent of investment per year. We
have checked that our results are not a¤ected by the following variants of the SDF above: (i)
equally weighting the MRS of shareholders (gives proportionally more weight to small stake-
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holders), (ii) weighting the MRS of shareholders by the squares of their ownership stakes, 
ia+1;t+1
2
, (gives proportionally more weight to big stakeholders), (iii) using the MRS of
the largest shareholder.
3.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is dened as a set of prices (bond prices, wages, risky asset returns) given
by time-invariant functions qt = q (t; Zt), p
H
t = p
H (t; Zt), wt = w (t; Zt) ; and RK;t =
RK (t; Zt), respectively, a set of cohort-specic value functions and decision rules for each in-
dividual i,

Va; H
i
a+1;t+1; 
i
a+1;t+1B
i
a+1;t+1
	A
a=1
and a law of motion for ; t+1 =   (t; Zt; Zt+1)
such that:
1. Households optimize:
Va(t; Zt; Z
i
a;t;W
i
a;t; H
i
a;t) = max
Hia+1;t+1;
i
a+1;t+1B
i
a+1;t+1
fU(Cia;t; H ia;t) (12)
+a+1jaEt[Va+1(t+1; Zt+1; Z
i
a;t+1;W
i
a+1;t+1; H
i
a+1;t+1)]g
subject to (6), (7), (8), and (9) if the individual of working age, and subject to (7)
and the analogous versions of (6), (8), and (9) (using pension income in place of wage
income), if the individual is retired.
2. Firms maximize value: VC;t solves (1), VH;t solves (2).
3. The price of land/permits pLt satises p
L
t = (1  ) pHt ZH;tL t
 
KH;tN
 
H;t

:
4. Land/permits supply equals land/permits demand: L = Lt:
5. Wages wt = w (t; Zt) satisfy
wt = (1  )ZC;tKC;tN C;t (13)
wt = (1  ) (1  ) pHt ZH;tLtK(1 )H;t N (1 ) H;t : (14)
6. The housing market clears: pHt = p
H (t; Zt) is such that
YH;t =
Z
S
 
H ia;t+1  H ia;t (1  H)

d: (15)
7. The bond market clears: qt = q (t; Zt) is such thatZ
S
Bia;td+B
F
t = 0; (16)
where BFt  0 is an exogenous supply of foreign capital discussed below.
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8. The risky asset market clears:
1 =
Z
S
ia;td: (17)
9. The labor market clears:
Nt  NC;t +NH;t =
Z
S
Lia;td: (18)
10. The social security tax rate is set so that total taxes equal total retirement benets:
Ntwt =
Z
S
PEia;td; (19)
11. Government revenue from land/permit rentals equals total government spending, Gt:
pLt Lt = Gt
12. The presumed law of motion for the state space t+1 =   (t; Zt; Zt+1) is consistent
with individual behavior.
Equations (13), (14) and (18) determine the NC;t and therefore determine the allocation
of labor across sectors:
(1  )ZC;tKC;tN C;t = (1  ) pHt ZH;tKH;t (Nt  NC;t)  : (20)
Also, the aggregate resource constraint for the economy must take into account the hous-
ing and risky capital market transactions/participation costs and the wasteful government
spending, which reduce consumption, the adjustment costs in productive capital, which re-
duce rm prots, and the change in net foreign capital in the bond market, which nances
domestic consumption and investment. Thus, non-housing output equals non-housing con-
sumption (inclusive of costs Ft) plus government spending plus aggregate investment (gross
of adjustment costs) less the net change in the value of foreign capital:
YC;t = Ct + Ft +Gt +

IC;t + C

IC;t
KC;t

KC;t

+

IH;t + H

IH;t
KH;t

KH;t

(21)
   BFt+1q (t; Zt) BFt 
where Ct and Ft are aggregate quantities dened as10
Ct 
Z
S
Cia;td Ft 
Z
S
F it d: (22)
To solve the model, it is necessary to approximate the innite dimensional object  with a
nite dimensional object. The appendix explains the solution procedure and how we specify
a nite dimensional vector to represent the law of motion for :
10Note that (21) simply results from aggregating the budget constraints across all households, imposing
all market clearing conditions, and using the denitions of dividends as equal to rm revenue minus costs.
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3.6 Model Calibration
This section discusses our calibration of the models primitive parameters under three al-
ternative set of parameterizations. Model 1 is our benchmark calibration, with normal
collateral requirements and housing transactions costs calibrated to roughly match the data
prior to the housing boom of 2000-2006. Model 2 is identical to Model 1 except that it has
undergone a nancial market liberalization (decline in collateral requirements and housing
transactions costs). In both Model 1 and Model 2, trade in the risk-free asset is entirely con-
ducted between domestic residents: BFt = 0. The Model 3 calibration is identical to that of
Model 2 except that we add an exogenous foreign demand for the risk-free bond: BFt > 0.
For convenience, the models parameters and their numerical calibration are summarized in
Table 1. We describe this calibration next.
3.6.1 Calibration of Parameters
The technology shocks ZC and ZH are assumed to follow two-state independent Markov
chains; the calibration is described in the Appendix. The Appendix also describes our
calibration of the individual productivity shocks.
Parameters pertaining to the rmsdecisions are set as follows. The capital depreciation
rate, , is set to 0.12, which corresponds to the average Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
depreciation rates for equipment and structures. The housing depreciation rate H , is set to
0.025 following Tuzel (2009). Following Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen (1985),
the capital share for the non-housing sector is set to  = 0:36: For the residential investment
sector, the value of the capital share in production is taken from a BEA study of gross product
originating, by industry. The study nds that the capital share in the construction sector
ranges from 29.4% and 31.0% over the period 1992-1996. We therefore set the capital share in
the housing sector to  = 0:30.11 The adjustment costs for capital in both sectors are assumed
to be the same quadratic function of the investment to capital-ratio, '
 
I
K
  2, where the
constant ' is chosen to represent a tradeo¤between the desire to match aggregate investment
volatility simultaneously with the volatility of asset returns. Under this calibration, rms
11From the November 1997 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Gross Prod-
uct by Industry, 194796, by Sherlene K.S. Lum and Robert E. Yuskavage.
http://www.bea.gov/scb/account_articles/national/1197gpo/maintext.htm
Gross Product Originating is equal to gross domestic income, whose components can be grouped into
categories that approximate shares of labor and capital. Under a Cobb-Douglas production function, these
equal shares of capital and labor in output.
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pay a cost only for net new investment; there is no cost to replace depreciated capital. This
implies that the total adjustment cost '
 
I
K
  2Kt under our calibration is quite small: on
average less than one percent of investment, It. The xed quantity of land/permits available
each period, L, is set to a level that permits the model to approximately match the housing
investment-GDP ratio. In post-war data this ratio is 6%; under our calibration of L, the
ratio ranges from 5% to 6.2% across Model, 1, 2 and 3. The share of land/permits in the
housing production function is set either to zero (as a baseline), requiring  = 1; or to 10%,
to match estimates in Davis and Heathcote (2005), requiring  = 0:9. A baseline of  = 1
allows us to illustrate the sensitivity of the results to the presence of the xed factor while
keeping our benchmark specication parsimonious.
Parameters of the individuals problem are set as follows. The subjective time discount
factor is set to  = 0:923 at annual frequency, to allow the model to match the mean of a
short-term Treasury rate in the data. The survival probability a+1ja = 1 for a+1  65. For
a+1 > 65, we set a+1ja equal to the fraction of households over 65 born in a particular year
alive at age a+ 1; as measured by the U.S. Census Bureau. From these numbers, we obtain
the stationary age distribution in the model, and use it to match the average earnings over
the life-cycle, Ga, to that observed from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Risk aversion
is set to  = 8; to help the models match the high Sharpe ratio for equity observed in the
data. The static elasticity of substitution between C and H is set to " = 1 (Cobb-Douglas
utility), following evidence in Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2010) that expenditure shares on
housing are approximately constant over time and across U.S. metropolitan statistical areas.
The weight,  on C in the utility function is set to 0.70, corresponding to a housing ex-
penditure share of 0.30. The regime-switching conditional variance in the unit root process
in idiosyncratic earnings is calibrated following Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007) to
match their estimates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. These are E = 0:0768;
and R = 0:1296:
The other parameters of the individuals problem are less precisely pinned down from
empirical observation. The costs of stock market participation could include non-pecuniary
costs as well as explicit transactions fees. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) nds support for the
presence of a xed, per period participation cost, but not for the hypothesis of variable
costs. She estimates the size of these costs and nds that they are small, less than 50 dollars
per year in year 2000 dollars. These ndings motivate our calibration of these costs so that
they are no greater than 1% of per capita, average consumption, denoted C
i
in Table 1.
We are aware of no publicly available time series on collateral requirements for mortgages
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and home equity loans. However, our own conversations with government economists and in-
dustry analysts who follow the housing sector indicated that, prior to the housing boom that
ended in 2006, the combined LTV for rst and second conventional mortgages (mortgages
without mortgage insurance) was rarely if ever allowed to exceed 75 to 80% of the appraised
value of the home. In addition, home equity lines of credit were not widely available until
relatively recently (McCarthy and Steindel (2007)). By contrast, during the boom years
households routinely bought homes with 100% nancing using a piggyback second or home
equity loan. Our Model 1 sets the maximum combined LTV (rst and second mortgages)
to be 75%, corresponding to $ = 25%: In Model 2, we lower this to $ = 1%: It should be
emphasized that 1 $ gives the maximum combined (rst and second mortgage) LTV ratio.
This will di¤er from the average LTV ratio because not everyone borrows up to the credit
limit.
The xed and variable housing transactions costs for housing consumption are governed
by the parameters  0 and  1. These costs are more comprehensive than the costs of buying
and selling existing homes. They include costs of any change in housing consumption, such
as home improvements and additions, that may be associated with mortgage renancing
and home equity extraction, as well as non-pecuniary psychological costs. As discussed in
Section 2, mortgage closing costs for rst and second (home equity) mortgages, home equity
lines of credit, and renancing eroded considerably in the period during or preceding the
housing boom, by 90% in some cases. Although some of these costs began to decline in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, industry analysts report that there was a delay in public
recognition. Mortgage servicers only gradually implemented marketing tools designed to
inform customers of lower costs for renancing and home equity withdrawal. Likewise,
news that borrowers could expect a reduction in nancial documentation and shortened
time periods from application to approval and from approval to closing also spread slowly
(Peristiani, Bennett, Monsen, Peach, and Rai¤ (1997)). To anchor the baseline level of these
costs, in Model 1 we set xed costs  0 and variable costs  1 to match the average number
of years individuals in the model go without changing housing consumption equal to the
average length of residency (in years) for home owners in the Survey of Consumer Finances
across the 1989-2001 waves of the survey. In the equilibrium of our model, this amount
corresponds to a value for  0 that is approximately 3.2% of annual per capita consumption,
and a value for  1 that is approximately 5.5% of the value of the house p
H
t H
i
a;t. In Models
2 and 3 we decrease  0 by 31%, setting it to approximately 2.2% of per capita aggregate
consumption, and we decrease  1 by 36%, setting it to 3.5% of home value p
H
t H
i
a;t. Given
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the comprehensive (and therefore unobservable) nature of transactions costs in the model,
the calibration of the Model 2 and 3 decline in costs is admittedly arbitrary, but is intended
to be conservative compared to the larger percentage decline in observable costs associated
with mortgage contracts, mortgage renancing, and home equity extraction.
Finally, we calibrate foreign ownership of U.S. debt, BFt , by targeting a value for foreign
bond holdings relative to GDP. Specically, when we add foreign capital to the economy in
Model 3, we experiment with several constant values for BFt  BF until the model solution
implies a value equal to 18% of average total output, Y , an amount that is approximately
equal to the rise in foreign ownership of U.S. Treasuries and agency debt over the period
2000-2008. Figure 4, Panel B shows that, as of the middle of 2008, foreign holdings of
long-term Treasuries alone represent 15% of GDP. Higher values are obtained if one includes
foreign holdings of U.S. agency debt and/or short-term Treasuries. Depending on how many
of these categories are included, the fraction of foreign holdings in 2008 ranges from 15-30%.
3.6.2 Model Returns
Housing Return Abstracting from transactions costs and borrowing constraints, the rst-
order condition for optimal housing choice is
@U
@Cia;t
=
1
pHt
Et
24 @U
@Cia+1;t+1
0@ @U@Hia+1;t+1
@U
@Cia+1;t+1
+ pHt+1 (1  H)
1A35 ; (23)
implying that each individuals housing return is given by
@U=@Hia+1;t+1
@Ut+1=@Cia+1;t+1
+ pHt+1 (1  H)
where
@U=@Hia+1;t+1
@Ut+1=@Cia+1;t+1
is the implicit rental price for housing services, referred to hereafter
as rent. For the national housing return, we dene national rent, Rt+1, as the average
of
@U=@Hia+1;t+1
@Ut+1=@Cia+1;t+1
across individuals. Given this denition of national rent, we dene the
corresponding national housing return as
RH;t+1  p
H
t+1 (1  H) +Rt+1
pHt
; (24)
Rt+1 
Z
S
@U=@H ia+1;t+1
@Ut+1=@Cia+1;t+1
d: (25)
In the model, pHt is the price of a unit of housing stock, which holds xed the composition
of housing (quality, square footage, etc.) over time.
We compare our model results with three di¤erent measures of single-family residential
price-rent ratios and associated housing returns. These are (i) a measure based on housing
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wealth for the household sector from the Flow of Funds, hereafter FoF, (ii) a measure based
on the Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage House Price index, hereafter Freddie Mac, (iii)
a measure based on the Case-Shiller national house price index, hereafter CS. The FoF data
are combined with a measure of housing services from the national income and product
accounts (NIPA) to measure rent, or housing services, and compute a national price-rent
ratio and housing return. The Freddie Mac and CS price indexes are combined with the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) rental index for shelter to do the same. The Appendix
details our construction of these variables.
It is important to note that the level of the average price-rent ratio in the data is not
identied. For Freddie Mac and CS, the price-rent ratio cannot be inferred at all, since both
price in the numerator and rent in the denominator are given by indexes. For FoF, we observe
the stock of housing wealth and the ow of housing services from NIPA, where the latter is a
measure of housing expenses for renters aggregated with an imputed rent measure for owner-
occupiers. Although both the wealth and housing services are in dollar units, the di¢ culty
here is that it is notoriously di¢ cult to impute rents for owner-occupiers from the rental
data of non-homeowners, a potentially serious problem since owners represent two-thirds of
the population. Moreover, because owners are on average wealthier than non-homeowners,
the NIPA imputed rent measure for owner-occupiers is likely to be biased down, implying
that the level of the price-rent ratio is likely to be biased up and the average housing return
biased down. For this reason, we do not attempt to match our model to the levels of the
price-rent ratios and housing returns in the data, instead focusing on the changes in these
ratios over time.
Equity Return The risky capital return RK;t in (3) is the return on a value-weighted
portfolio of assets. This is not the same as the return on equity, which is a levered claim on
the assets. To obtain an equity return, RE;t, the return on assets, RK;t, must be adjusted
for leverage:
RE;t  Rf ;t + (1 +B=E) (RK;t  Rf;t) ;
where B=E is the xed debt-equity ratio and where RK;t is the portfolio return for risky
capital given in (3).12 Note that this calculation explicitly assumes that corporate debt in
the model is exogenous, and held in xed proportion to the value of the rm. (There is no
nancing decision.) For the results reported below, we set B=E = 2=3 to match aggregate
12The cost of capital RK is a portfolio weighted average of the return on debt Rf and the return on equity
Re: RK = aRf + (1  a)Re, where a  BB+E :
23
debt-equity ratios computed in Benninga and Protopapadakis (1990).
4 Results
This section presents some of the models main implications. Much of our analysis consists
of a comparison of stochastic steady states across Models, 1, 2 and 3.13 We also study a
dynamic transition path for house prices and national price-rent ratios designed to mimic
the state of the economy and housing market conditions over the period 2000-2009. For
many results, the ndings for the case with land/permits ( = :9) are quite close to those
of the baseline  = 1 case. We therefore present here the complete set of results for the
baseline case and present results for the specication with land/permits only if they di¤er
signicantly from the baseline case, or when they pertain to housing and nancial wealth
statistics, the main focus of the paper.14 We start by presenting a set of benchmark business
cycle and life-cycle results.
4.1 Benchmark Results
4.1.1 Business Cycle Variables
Table 2 presents benchmark results for Hodrick-Prescott (Hodrick and Prescott (1997)) de-
trended aggregate quantities. Panel A of Table 2 presents business cycle moments from U.S.
annual data over the period 1953 to 2008. Panel B of Table 2 presents simulated data to
summarize the implications for these same moments for the benchmark Model 1, baseline
case ( = 1). Panel C presents the same results for Model 2. We report statistics for total
output, or GDP  YC + pHYH + CH , for non-housing consumption (inclusive of expendi-
tures on nancial services), equal to C + F , for housing consumption CH;t, dened as price
per unit of housing services times quantity of housing or CH;t  RtHt, for total (housing
and non-housing) consumption CT = C + F + CH , for non-housing investment (inclusive
of adjustment costs) I = (IC;t + C ()KC;t) + (IH;t + H ()KH;t), for residential investment
pHt YH;t and for total investment IT = I + p
HYH .
The standard deviation of total aggregate consumption divided by the standard deviation
of GDP is 0.77 in Model 1 and 0.69 in Model 2, close to the 0.70 value found in the data.
13With all shocks in the model set to zero, the portfolio choice problem is indeterminant since all assets
earn the risk-free return. Thus, there is no deterministic steady state in this model. We dene stochastic
steady state as the average equilibrium allocation over a large number of simulated sample paths.
14The complete set of results for  = 0:9 are available upon request.
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In addition, the level of GDP volatility in the model is close to that in the data. Thus the
model produces a plausible amount of aggregate consumption volatility. Total investment is
more volatile than output, both in the model and in the data, but the model produces too
little relative volatility: the ratio of the standard deviation of investment to that of output is
1.7 in Model 1 but is 2.9 in the data.15 The model does a good job of matching the relative
volatility of residential investment to output: in the data the ratio of these volatilities is
4.6, while it is 5.4 in Model 1 and 5.1 in Model 2. Finally, both in the model and the
data, residential investment is less correlated with output than is consumption and total
investment.
Table 3 shows the models implications for the cyclical properties of national house prices.
The housing price indexes in the data are all procyclical, but not as strongly so as in the
model. As in the data, the model implies that both the level of house prices and price-rent
ratios are procyclical, in Models 1, 2, and 3. Note that price-rent ratios are less procyclical
than is the level of house prices because rents, in the denominator, are also procyclical.
For the cases without land/permits ( = 1, panel A), the correlation between GDP and
the national price-rent ratio ranges from 0.17 to 0.62 across the three models. The results
for  = 0:9 are similar and are reported in panel B. In the data, these correlations vary
substantially by data source and sample, ranging from 0.29 to 0.10.
4.1.2 Life Cycle Age-Income Proles
Turning to individual-level implications, Figure 5 presents the age and income distribution
of wealth, both in the model and in the historical data as given by the Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF). The gure shows wealth, by age, divided by average wealth across all house-
holds, for three income groups (low, medium and high earners). In both the model and the
data, nancial wealth is hump-shaped over the life-cycle, and is slightly negative or close to
zero early in life when households borrow to nance home purchases. As agents age, wealth
accumulates. In the data, nancial (nonhousing) wealth peaks between 60 and 70 years
old (depending on the income level). In the model, the peak for all three income groups
is 65 years. After retirement, nancial wealth is drawn down until death. Households in
the model continue to hold some net worth in the nal years of life to insure against the
possibility of living long into old age. A similar observation holds in the data. For low and
15Volatility of investment could be increased by adding stochastic depreciation in capital as in Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008), or by adding investment-specic technology
shocks.
25
medium earners, the model gets the average amount of wealth about right, but it some what
under-predicts the wealth of high earners early in the life-cycle.
The right-hand panels in Figure 5 plot the age distribution of housing wealth. Up to age
65, the model produces about the right level of housing wealth for each income group, as
compared to the data. In the data, however, housing wealth peaks around age 60 for high
earners and age 67 for low and medium earners. By contrast, in the model housing wealth
remains high until death. In the absence of an explicit rental market, owning a home is the
only way to generate housing consumption, an argument in the utility function. For this
reason, agents in the model continue to maintain a high level of housing wealth later in life
even as they drawn down nancial wealth.
What is the e¤ect of a nancial market liberalization and foreign capital inux on the
optimal portfolio decisions of individuals? Table 4 exhibits the age and income distribution
of housing wealth relative to total net worth, both over time in the SCF data and in Models,
1, 2 and 3 for  = 1 (panel A) and  = 0:9 (panel B). The benchmark model captures an
empirical stylized fact emphasized by Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2005), namely that
young households hold most of their wealth in consumer durables (primarily housing) and
very little in nancial assets. Indeed, our calibrations imply that young households (age 35
and under), hold slightly more of their wealth as durables than do households in the data.
By comparing the steady states of Model 1 and Model 3, we see that the model also
predicts that a nancial market liberalization plus an inow of foreign capital leads house-
holds of all ages and income groups to shift the composition of their wealth towards housing.
This occurs because the combination of lower interest rates, lower collateral constraints, and
lower housing transactions costs in Model 3 makes possible greater housing investment by
the young, whose incomes are growing and who rely on borrowing to expand their housing
consumption. But the decline in housing transactions costs also has important e¤ects on the
asset allocation of net savers (primarily older, higher income individuals), consistent with
the ndings of Stokey (2009) who shows that such costs can have large e¤ects on portfolio
decisions. Here, a decline in housing transactions costs makes housing relatively less risky as
compared to equity, which causes even unconstrained individuals to shift the composition of
their wealth towards housing. Because of the simultaneous relaxation in credit constraints,
the increased importance of housing is still largest for the young. Table 4, Panel A, shows
that the housing wealth-total wealth ratio rises by 19% for the young between Model 1 and
Model 3. But, the housing wealth-total wealth ratio also rises for other groups: it rises by
13% for households above age 35 and by 14% for high income individuals. Table 4 shows
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that these changes are in line with those in individual-level data from 2001 to 2007.
4.2 Asset Pricing
4.2.1 Return Moments
Table 5 presents asset pricing implications of the model, for the calibrations represented by
Models 1, 2 and 3 and for  = 1 (panel A) and  = 0:9 (panel B). The statistics reported
are averages over 1000 periods. We rst discuss the implications of the benchmark Model 1
and then move on to discuss how the statistics change with a nancial market liberalization
and inow of foreign money.
The benchmark model matches the historical mean return for the risk-free rate and only
slightly overstates the volatility of the risk-free rate. The model produces a sizable equity
return of 5.62% per annum (and annual equity premium of 4%) and an annual Sharpe ratio
of 0.31 (panel A), compared to 0.34 in the data. Two factors related to the cyclicality of the
cross-sectional distribution of consumption contribute to the models high average Sharpe
ratio. First, idiosyncratic income risk is countercyclical. Second, house prices and therefore
collateral values are procyclical, making borrowing constraints countercyclical. These factors
mean that insurance/risk-sharing opportunities are eliminated when households need them
mostin recessionsresulting in a high risk premium and Sharpe ratio.
Turning to the implications for housing assets, the average housing return in the bench-
mark Model 1 with  = 1 is 13% per annum; the standard deviation of the housing return
in the model is 6.2% per annum. The housing return Sharpe ratio for Model 1 is 1.52. The
ndings for the  = 0:9 case are similar.
Financial Market Liberalization and the Housing Boom How are these statistics
a¤ected by nancial market liberalization? Table 5 shows that both the equity premium and
the equity Sharpe ratio fall in an economy that has undergone a nancial market liberaliza-
tion. The equity premium falls from 4% to 3.6% from Model 1 to Model 2, while the Sharpe
ratio falls from 0.31 to 0.23, a 26% decline (Panel B). A nancial market liberalization lowers
the risk premium on housing assets even more. The housing risk premium is cut by 40 per-
cent from Model 1 to Model 2, from 11.39% per annum to 6.86%, while the housing Sharpe
ratio declines by 47% from 1.52 to 0.8. The results in panel B of Table 7 for  = 0:9 are
similar. This decline in the riskiness of both housing and equity assets reects the greater
amount of risk-sharing possible after a nancial market liberalization, discussed further be-
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low. The housing Sharpe ratio declines more than the equity Sharpe ratio because there
is an additional factor pushing down the housing risk premium that is inoperative for the
equity market: a nancial market liberalization is accompanied by a decline in transactions
costs for housing but not for equity (or the risk-free asset).
The last column of Table 5 shows that, when  = 1; the national price-rent ratio pH=R is
23.4% higher in Model 2 than it is in the benchmarkModel 1 (Panel B, Table 5). These results
isolate the e¤ect of a nancial market liberalization, since they are a comparison of steady
states only. (Below we study a dynamic transition that includes economic shocks.) But since
the price-rent ratio is procyclical, this nding implies that a nancial market liberalization
adds substantial fuel to the re in an already booming housing market during an economic
expansion. At the same time, Table 5 shows that a nancial market liberalization by itself
leads to a sharp increase in equilibrium interest rates. Indeed, the endogenous risk-free
interest rate more than doubles in Model 2 to 3.56% per annum, from 1.63% in Model
1. This occurs because the relaxation of borrowing constraints and housing transactions
costs reduces precautionary savings, as households endogenously respond to the improved
risk-sharing/insurance opportunities a¤orded by nancial market liberalization. It follows
that the increase in price-rent ratios following a nancial market liberalization is entirely
attributable to the decline in the housing risk premium, which more than o¤sets the rise in
equilibrium interest rates.16 These results are similar for the  = 0:9 case in Panel C: here
the price-rent ratio is 27.5% higher in Model 2 than in Model 1.
The Role of Foreign Capital in the Housing Boom Model 3 adds to Model 2
an inow of foreign capital calibrated to match the increase in foreign ownership of U.S.
Treasuries and U.S. agency debt over the period 2000-2006. Table 5 shows that such an
increase has a large downward impact on the equilibrium interest rate, which falls from 3.56%
in Model 2 to 0.0 in Model 3 ( = 1), or from 3.45% to 0.39% ( = :9). The magnitude
of these declines are close to the reduction in real interest rates observed in U.S. data over
the period 2000-2006.17 The last column of Table 5 shows that the average price-rent ratio
is 31% ( = 1) or 34% percent higher (  = 0:9) in the steady state of Model 3 than in it
16Note also that there are no di¤erences in average annual rental growth rates across Models 1, and 2 and
Model 3. Because the statistics for each model are computed from averages across 1000 periods, they give
the long-run annualized values of rental growth. This is the same across all three models because it is pinned
down by the steady state growth of technology, which is the same in each model, assumed to be two percent.
17Figure 3 shows the decline in nominal rates; subtracting o¤ ination to compute a real rate, we observe
that the 10-year real Treasury bond rate fell from 3.6% to 0.93% from December 1999 to June 2006.
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is in the benchmark Model 1. (As a comparison, the last column of Table 5, Panel A shows
that these values represents all of the increase in the FoF and Freddie Mac house price-rent
ratios over the 2000-2006 period, which each rose 31%, and 72 percent of the increase in the
Case-Shiller index, which rose 43%.) The majority of the rise in the price-rent ratio over
the benchmark Model 1, however, comes not from the foreign-capital-driven lower interest
rates, but rather from the nancial market liberalization. For both  = 1 and  = 0:9, the
price-rent ratio is 6% higher in Model 3 than it is in Model 2. This represents less than a
quarter of the total change from Model 1 to Model 3.
The reason lies with the endogenous response of the housing risk premium to an increase
in foreign demand for the safe asset. By itself, foreign purchases of the safe asset make both
equity and housing assets more risky. Both the risk premium and Sharpe ratio for equity and
housing rise substantially from Model 2 to Model 3, for two reasons. First, the increase in
foreign money forces domestic residents as a whole to take a leveraged position in the risky
assets. This by itself increases the volatility of asset and housing returns, translating into
higher risk premia. Second, domestic savers are crowded out of the bond market by foreign
governmental holders who are willing to hold the safe asset at any price. As a result, they
become more exposed to systematic risk in the equity and housing markets. This means
that the equity and housing Sharpe ratios must rise from Model 2 to Model 3, as domestic
savers shift the composition of their nancial wealth towards risky securities. In addition,
the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, t+1
t
; rises along with (as discussed below) a
decrease in measured risk-sharing from Model 2 to Model 3.
Despite the increase in risk premia resulting from the foreign capital inow, the housing
risk premium is still lower in Model 3 than in the baseline Model 1 because the decline
from Model 1 to Model 2 more than o¤sets the rise from Model 2 to Model 3. Still, the
rise from Model 2 to Model 3 means that the endogenous response of risk premia to foreign
purchases of U.S. government bonds substantially limits the extent to which foreign capital
inows can inuence home prices. These ndings underscore the importance of general
equilibrium e¤ects on risk premia for understanding the role of foreign capital inows in a
housing boom. In partial equilibrium models of the housing market (e.g., Titman (1982)),
or in small open-economy models without aggregate risk (e.g., Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and
Nikolov (2008)), the risk premium is held exogenously xed. As a consequence, a decline in
the interest rate equal in magnitude to that generated by the large inux of foreign money
considered here, would be su¢ cientby itselfto explain the rise in price-rent ratios observed
from 2000-2006. In general equilibrium this is not possible because a foreign capital inow
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causes the endogenous risk premium to rise at the same time that it causes interest rates to
fall, substantially limiting the positive e¤ect of lower interest rates on home prices.
4.2.2 Transition Dynamics: Housing Boom to Bust
Above we studied the e¤ects of housing nance by comparing stochastic steady states. The
steady state di¤erences between models show long-run changes only and do not account
for business cycle uctuations. In this section we study a dynamic transition path for house
prices and price-rent ratios, in response to a series of shocks designed to mimic both the state
of the economy and housing market conditions over the period 2000-2009.18 We assume that,
at time 0 (taken to be the year 2000), the economy begins in the stochastic steady state of
Model 1. In 2001, the economy undergoes an unanticipated shift to Model 3 (nancial
market liberalization and foreign holdings of U.S. bonds equal to 18% of GDP), at which
time the policy functions and beliefs of Model 3 are applied.19 The adjustment to the new
stochastic steady state of model 3 is then traced out over the seven year period from 2001
to 2006, as the state variables evolve. Starting in 2007 and continuing through 2009, the
economy is presumed to undergo a surprise reversal of the nancial market liberalization but
not the foreign capital inow, and as such unexpectedly shifts to a new state in which all the
parameters of Model 1 again apply except those governing the foreign capital inow, which
we assume remains equal to 18% of GDP annually, as in Model 3. This hybrid of Models 1
and 3 is referred to as Model 4.
In addition, we feed in a specic sequence of aggregate shocks designed to mimic the
business cycle over this period. The aggregate technology shock processes ZC and ZH follow
Markov chains, with two possible values for each shock, lowand high(see the Appendix).
Denote these possibilities with the subscripts land h:
ZC = fZCl; ZChg ; ZH = fZHl; ZHhg :
As the general economy began to decline in 2000, construction relative to GDP in U.S. data
continued to expand, and did so in every quarter until the end of 2005. Thus, the recession of
2001 was a nonhousing recession. Starting in 2006, construction relative to GDP fell and has
18Ideally, we would study such a path after solving a larger framework that specied a probability law over
parameters corresponding to the di¤erent models (1 through 3) dened above. Unfortunately, solving such
a specication in the existing model would be computationally infeasible. We therefore pursue the simpler
strategy described above.
19Along the transition path, foreign holdings of bonds are increased linearly from 0% to 18% of GDP from
2000 to 2006 and held constant at 18% from 2006 to 2009.
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done so in every quarter through the most recent data at the time of this writing (2009:Q2).
Thus, in contrast to the 2001 recession, housing led the recession of 2007-2009. To capture
these cyclical dynamics, we feed in the following sequence of shocks for the period 2000-2009:
fZCl; ZHhgt=2000 ; fZCl; ZHhgt=2001 ; fZCh; ZHhgt=2002 ; fZCh; ZHhgt=2003 ; fZCh; ZHhgt=2004 ;
fZCh; ZHhgt=2005 ; fZCh; ZHlgt=2006 ; fZCl; ZHlgt=2007, fZCl; ZHlgt=2008, fZCl; ZHlgt=2009.
Figure 6 shows the transition dynamics of the price-rent ratio, pHt =Rt; (right scale) are
such that it rises by 41% over the period 2000-2006 for the case with  = 1, boosted by
economic growth, the nancial market liberalization, and lower interest rates. House prices
themselves (left scale) rise 18% from 2000-2006 when  = 1, and 26% for the model with
land/permits ( = 0:9). The increase in home prices for the case  = 0:9 is signicantly
greater than that for the  = 1 case because the presence of land/permits makes housing
supply more inelastic. The increase in pHt =Rt from 2000-2006 is larger than the increase in
pHt because, in the model, rents fall modestly over this period as the housing stock expands
in response to positive economic shocks. The model generates a decline of greater than 19%
( = 0:9) or 16% ( = 1) in the price-rent ratio and a decline of more than 14% ( = 0:9)
or 12% ( = 1) in home prices pHt in just the two year period 2007 to 2009, driven by the
economic contraction and by a presumed reversal of the nancial market liberalization.
Finally, Figure 7 shows that the price of land/permits pLt for the model with  = 0:9
rises and falls over the transition with the price of housing. Thus, the expansion not only
drives a construction and housing boom; it also raises the price of the xed factor of housing
production by 18% from 2000-2006. Land/permits prices subsequently fall along with house
prices from 2007 to 2009, as the economy contracts and collateral constraints and transactions
costs revert to previously higher levels.
4.2.3 Cyclical Dynamics of Housing: What Do Changes in House Price-Rent
Ratios Forecast?
In this section we ask how cyclical increases in price-rent ratios a¤ect expectations of future
rental growth rates and future home price appreciation. In the model, 100% of the variability
in the log price-rent ratio is attributable to variation in the rationally expected present
discounted value of future rental growth rates. This variability can itself be divided into
two parts: that attributable to variation in expected future rents and that attributable to
variation in expected future housing returns (discount rates). Thus, to address this question,
we look within each model at the relation between purely cyclical changes in price-rent ratios
and subsequent movements in housing return and rents. The left panels of Table 6 show
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regression results (coe¢ cient, t-stat, R2) for predicting long-horizon future housing returns
and rental growth rates using todays price-rent ratio. (The results reported are for the  = 1
case; results for  = 0:9 are very similar and are omitted.)
High price-rent ratios forecast lower future housing returns, or future home price depre-
ciation. This aspect of the model is consistent with empirical evidence in the bottom left
panels of Table 6 (see also Campbell, Davis, Gallin, and Martin (2010)). In the model this
occurs in part because high price-rent ratios in an expansion forecast lower future excess re-
turns to housing assets, driven by a lower housing risk premium. The housing risk premium
falls as the economy grows for two reasons. First, economic growth reduces (but does not
eliminate) uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk via (4). Second, the endogenous increase in
house prices raises collateral values and relaxes borrowing restrictions, a¤ording households
more insurance against remaining income risk.
Table 6 also shows that high price-rent ratios forecast lower future rental growth. It
is often suggested that increases in price-rent ratios reect an expected increase in rental
growth. For example, in a partial equilibrium setting where discount rates are constant,
higher house prices relative to fundamentals can only be generated by higher implicit rental
growth rates in the future (Sinai and Souleles (2005), Campbell and Cocco (2007)). The
partial equilibrium setting, however, ignores the endogenous response of both discount rates
and residential investment to economic growth. In general equilibrium, positive economic
shocks can simultaneously drive discount rates down and residential investment up, leading
high price-rent ratios to reect an expected decline in rental growth. As the housing supply
expands, the cost of future housing services (rent) is forecast to be lower. It follows that
high price-rent ratios in expansions must entirely reect expectations of future home price
depreciation (lower future returns). Although future rental growth is expected to be lower,
price-rent ratios still rise in response to positive economic shocks because the expected decline
in future housing returns more than o¤sets the expected fall in future rental growth.20
For completeness, Table 6 also reports predictability results for equity returns. In model
generated data, both the raw equity return and the excess return are forecastable over long
horizons, consistent with evidence from U.S. stock market returns.21 High price-dividend
ratios forecast low future equity returns and low excess returns (low equity risk premia) over
20Predictable variation in housing returns must therefore account for more than 100 percent of the vari-
ability in price-rent ratios.
21See, for example, the summary evidence in Cochrane (2005), Chapter 20, Lettau and Ludvigson (2010),
and Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008).
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horizons ranging from 1 to 30 years. Compared to the data, the model produces about the
right amount of forecastability in excess equity returns, but produces too much forecastability
of dividend growth. This is not surprising since, unlike an endowment/exchange economy
where dividends are set exogenously, in the model here both prots and the value of the rm
respond endogenously to aggregate shocks.22
4.3 Risk Sharing and Inequality
In the limited risk-sharing environment here, risk premia are driven by amount of risk-
sharing/insurance possible in the economy. Table 7 presents four measures of inequality or
risk-sharing: (i) the cross-sectional standard deviation in the individual consumption share in
aggregate consumption, (ii) the variance of log consumption, (iii) the Gini coe¢ cient of con-
sumption, and (iv) the cross-sectional standard deviation of the individual marginal rates
of substitution,
@U=@Cia+1;t+1
@U=@Cia;t
. The rst three are measures of inequality in the numeraire
consumption good. The last is a measure of risk-sharing. Under perfect risk-sharing (com-
plete markets) individuals equate their marginal rates of substitution state by state. Thus
the cross-sectional standard deviation of the marginal rates of substitution is a quantitative
measure of market incompleteness, with higher values indicating less risk-sharing.
Table 7 shows that the decline in risk premia from Model 1 to Model 2 (documented
above) coincides with an increase in risk-sharing and a decline in consumption inequality,
according to all measures. Risk-sharing improves both because a nancial liberalization
directly increases access to credit, and because lower transactions costs reduce the expense
of acquiring additional collateral, which increases borrowing capacity. Both factors allow
heterogeneous households to insure more of their risks.
By contrast, Table 7 shows that these same measures of risk-sharing and consumption
inequality rise from Model 2 to Model 3, isolating the e¤ect of the foreign capital inow. The
rise in foreign capital, in e¤ect, makes existing nancial markets more incomplete because
the foreign governmental holdersperfectly inelastic demand for the risk-free asset reduces
the availability of this asset to domestic savers for insurance. Thus, the increase in risk-
sharing and fall in consumption inequality resulting from a nancial market liberalization
is o¤set by a fall in risk-sharing and a rise in inequality resulting from foreign purchases of
the risk-free asset. In the calibration here, the latter slightly more than o¤sets the former
22For this same reason, the model also produces too much predictability in raw returns driven by too much
predictability in interest rates. Positive economic shocks increase consumption but not as much as income,
thus saving and the capital stock rise, pushing down expected rates of return to saving, or interest rates.
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so that the net change in consumption inequality is small but positive moving from Model
1 to Model 3.
What about wealth inequality? Unlike consumption inequality, a nancial market liberal-
ization and foreign demand for the risk-free asset have reinforcing e¤ects on nancial wealth
inequality. Figure 8 shows the Gini index for inequality in total net worth, decomposed into
nancial wealth and housing wealth, for Models 1, 2, and 3 (right scale), as well as the Gini
index based on the SCF data for the years 2001, 2004 and 2007 (left scale). The gure
compares the change in the wealth Gini index from 2001 to 2007 with the change in the
model Gini index between Models 1, 2 and 3.
While the present model does not explain the degree of wealth inequality in the data, it
captures recent trends in wealth inequality.23 In the data, the Gini index for nancial wealth
rises by almost 20 percent between 2001 and 2007. In the model, the Gini for nancial wealth
increases by about 10 percent as a result of nancial market liberalization (Model 1 to Model
2), and by another 5.4 percent as a result of foreign governmental demand for the safe asset
(Model 2 to Model 3). In addition, both in the model and in the data, housing wealth
inequality increases far less than nancial wealth inequality: the Gini index for housing
wealth in the SCF data is at from 2001 to 2007, while in the model it falls slightly from
Model 1 to Model 3.
Why do a nancial market liberalization and a foreign capital infusion have reinforcing
upward a¤ects on nancial wealth inequality but o¤setting a¤ects on consumption inequal-
ity? A nancial market liberalization relaxes nancial frictions, making it easier to borrow
against home equity and making it less costly to transact. This improves risk-sharing and
reduces consumption inequality and housing inequality. But nancial wealth inequality rises
because, as domestic borrowers (mostly young individuals) take advantage of the market
liberalization to increase current consumption, their net worth position deteriorates. At the
same time, domestic savers as a whole (older households primarily concerned about retire-
ment) are forced to shift the composition of their wealth toward risky securities as a result
of the inelastic foreign demand for the safe asset. They therefore earn a higher rate of return
on the risky asset and on their savings, as compared to Model 2, which drives their wealth
more positive. These ndings may help explain why wealth inequality has risen more than
consumption inequality in recent decades.24
23The level of the Gini index in the model is lower than that in the data. Following Krusell and Smith
(1997, 1998), the wealth distribution could be better approximated by introducing heterogeneity in the
subjective time discount factor.
24Krueger and Perri (2006) and Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2009) study income and consumption
34
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the macroeconomic and household-level consequences of uc-
tuations in housing wealth and housing nance. The framework studied here endogenizes
the interaction among nancial and housing wealth, output and investment, rates of return
and risk premia in both housing and equity assets, and consumption and wealth inequality.
We have focused much of our investigation on studying the macroeconomic impact of sys-
temic changes in housing nance that were a key characteristic of housing markets during
the housing boom period from 2000-2006 and its aftermath.
The model implies that national house price-rent ratios may uctuate considerably in
response to a nancial market liberalization, as well as in response to movements in the
aggregate economy. A fundamental result of the paper is that these factors inuence house-
holdsopportunities for risk-sharing, and it is through this mechanism that they inuence
home prices. In a simulated transition for the period 2000-2009, the model captures all of the
run-up observed in U.S. national house price-rent ratios from 2000-2006 and predicts a sharp
decline in housing markets starting in 2007. We found the general equilibrium environment
to be particularly important for understanding some features of these results. For example,
the model implies that procyclical increases in national house price-rent ratios must reect
lower future housing returns rather than higher future rents, a nding that is di¢ cult to
comprehend without taking into account the endogenous response of residential investment
and discount rates to positive economic shocks.
A nancial market liberalization increases house prices because it drives risk premia in
both the housing and equity market down and shifts the composition of wealth for all age
and income groups towards housing. These changes, along with economic shocks, are the
largest drivers of volatility in the model price-rent ratio. By contrast, borrowed funds from
the rest of the worldwhile having a large depressing e¤ect on interest rateswere found
to play a limited role in generating asset booms. This latter result runs contrary to the
perception that, by driving interest rates lower, the vast inow of foreign money into U.S.
bond markets from 2000 to 2006 was a major factor in the housing boom.25 We show that the
general equilibrium e¤ects of foreign capital on risk premia substantially o¤set the e¤ects of
inequality directly, and show that consumption inequality has risen less than income inequality. Their
results for saving and income inequality suggest that wealth inequality has risen more than consumption
inequality over time.
25This perception has been voiced by policymakers, academics, and industry analysts. See for example,
Bernanke (2005, 2008), and Stiglitz (2010).
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lower interest rates, thereby limiting the role of foreign money in driving home prices. These
results suggest that large uctuations in borrowing from the rest of the world may not be
the most important determinants of asset price uctuations, and they lend interpretation to
the observation that house prices have declined sharply in aftermath of the credit crisis even
as foreign capital inows have remained high and interest rates low.
Although the theoretical framework studied here generates a large boom-bust pattern
in home prices, it has no role for a bubble: all of the variability in the models price-rent
ratio is attributable to variability in the rationally expected present discounted value of
future rents. An important part of this variability is attributable to the changes in housing
nance we have studied. The model takes no stand on whether these changes in housing
nance can be characterized as a rational response to economic conditions and/or regulatory
changes. Focusing on features of the recent housing boom, Piskorski and Tchistyi (2008)
study the mortgage contracting problem in a partial equilibrium setting with stochastic
(exogenous) home price appreciation. They nd that many elements of the housing boom,
such as the relaxation of credit limits, the subsidization of risky (subprime) borrowers, and
the clustering of defaults among riskier borrowers, can be explained as the outcome of an
optimal dynamic mortgage contracting problem in which both borrowers and lenders are fully
rational. Combining the partial-equilibrium mortgage contracting problem with the general
equilibrium model of limited risk-sharing is an important challenge for future research.
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Appendix
This appendix describes how we calibrate the stochastic shock processes in the model, de-
scribes the historical data we use to measure house price-rent ratios and returns, and de-
scribes our numerical solution strategy.
Calibration of Shocks
The aggregate technology shock processes ZC and ZH are calibrated following a two-state
Markov chain, with two possible values for each shock, fZC = ZCl; ZC = ZChg ;
fZH = ZHl; ZH = ZHhg ; implying four possible combinations:
ZC = ZCl; ZH = ZHl
ZC = ZCh; ZH = ZHl
ZC = ZCl; ZH = ZHh
ZC = ZCh; ZH = ZHh:
Each shock is modeled as,
ZCl = 1  eC ; ZCh = 1 + eC
ZHl = 1  eH ; ZCh = 1 + eH ;
where eC and eH are calibrated to match the volatilities of GDP and residential investment
in the data.
We assume that ZC and ZH are independent of one another. Let PC be the transition
matrix for ZC and PH be the transition matrix for ZH . The full transition matrix equals
P =
"
pHll P
C pHlhP
C
pHhlP
C pHhhP
C
#
;
where
PH =
"
pHll p
H
lh
pHhl p
H
hh
#
=
"
pHll 1  pHll
1  pHhh pHhh
#
;
and where we assume PC ; dened analogously, equals PH . We calibrate values for the
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matrices as
PC =
"
:60 :40
:25 :75
#
PH =
"
:60 :40
:25 :75
#
=>
P =
266664
:36 :24 :24 :16
:15 :45 :10 :30
:15 :10 :45 :30
:0625 :1875 :1875 :5625
377775 :
With these parameter values, we match the average length of expansions divided by the
average length of recessions (equal to 5.7 in NBER data from over the period 1945-2001).
We dene a recession as the event fZCl;; ZHl;g ; so that the probability of staying in a recession
is pHll p
C
ll = 0:36; implying that a recession persists on average for 1= (1  :36) = 1:56 years.
We dene an expansion as either the event fZCh;ZHl;g or fZCl; ZHhg or fZCh;ZHh;g : Thus,
there are four possible states (one recession, three expansion). The average amount of time
spent in each state is given by the stationary distribution (4 1) vector , where
P = :
That is,  is the eigenvector for P with corresponding eigenvalue equal to 1. The rst
element of , denoted 1; multiplies the probabilities in P for transitioning to any of the
four states tomorrow conditional on being in a recession state today. 1 therefore gives the
average amount of time spent in the recession state, while 2; 3; and 4 give the average
amount of time spent in the other three (expansion) states. Given the matrix P above, the
solution for  is
 =
0BBBB@
0:1479
0:2367
0:2367
0:3787
1CCCCA :
This implies the chain spends 14.79% of the time in a recession state and 85.21% of the time
in expansion states, so the average length of expansions relative to that of recessions is then
85:21= (14:79) = 5:76 years.
Idiosyncratic income shocks follow the rst order Markov process log
 
Zia;t

= log
 
Zia 1;t 1

+
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ia;t; where 
i
a;t takes on one of two values in each aggregate state:
ia;t =
(
E with Pr = 0:5
 E with Pr = 0:5
; if ZC;t  E (ZC;t)
ia;t =
(
R with Pr = 0:5
 R with Pr = 0:5
; if ZC;t < E (ZC;t)
R > E:
Housing Price and Return Data
Our rst measure of house prices uses aggregate housing wealth for the household sector
from the Flow of Funds (FoF) (which includes the part of private business wealth which
is residential real estate wealth) and housing consumption from the National Income and
Products Accounts. The price-rent ratio is the ratio of housing wealth in the fourth quarter
of the year divided by housing consumption summed over the year. The return is constructed
as housing wealth in the fourth quarter plus housing consumption over the year divided by
housing wealth in the fourth quarter of the preceding year. We subtract CPI ination to
express the return in real terms and population growth in order to correct for the growth
in housing quantities that is attributable solely to population growth. (Since the return is
based on a price times quantity, it grows mechanically with the population. In the model,
population growth is zero.) The advantage of this housing return series is that it is for
residential real estate and for the entire population. The disadvantages are that it is not a
per-share return (it has the growth in the housing stock in it, which we only partially control
for by subtracting population growth), it is not an investable asset return, and it does not
control for quality changes in the housing stock. There is also substantial measurement error
in how the Flow of Funds imputes market prices to value the housing stock as well as in how
the BEA imputes housing services consumption for owners. These errors, however, may be
more likely to a¤ect the level of the price-rent ratio more than the change in the ratio.
Our second series combines the Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage House Price index
for home purchases (Freddie Mac) and the rental price index for shelter from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). The price-rent ratio is the ratio of the price index in the last quarter
of the year, divided by the rent index averaged over the quarters in the year. Since the level
of the price-rent ratio is indeterminate (given by the ratio of two indexes), we normalize the
level of the series by assuming that the 1970 Freddie Mac price-rent ratio is the same as that
of the FoF price-rent ratio in 1970. The return is the price index plus the rent divided by
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the price index at the end of the previous year. We subtract CPI ination to express the
return in real terms. The FoF return has a correlation of 82% with the Freddie Mac return
over 1973-2008. Since the Freddie Mac price index is a repeat-sales price index, it controls
for quality changes in the housing stock (price changes are computed on the same house). It
also is a per-share return (no quantities). Alternative repeat-sale price indices such as the
Freddie Mac CMHPI which includes renancing and purchases, or the OFHEO house price
index, deliver similar results. The same is true if we use the BLS rental index for housing
instead of shelter. (The rental index for housing includes utilities while the rental price index
for shelter excludes them).
The third series is the ratio of the Case-Shiller national house price index to the Bureau
of Labor Statisticss price index of shelter (CS). The Case-Shiller price index is also a repeat-
sales price index, which receives a lot of attention in the literature. It is available from 1987
on a quarterly basis. Since both the FoF and CS price-rent ratios are ratios of two indexes,
we normalize the rst observations of the Freddie Mac and CS price-rent ratio to be the
same as the FoF ratio for that year.
Numerical Solution Procedure
The numerical solution strategy consists of solving the individuals problem taking as given
her beliefs about the evolution of the aggregate state variables. With this solution in hand,
the economy is simulated for many individuals and the simulation is used to compute the
equilibrium evolution of the aggregate state variables, given the assumed beliefs. If the
equilibrium evolution di¤ers from the beliefs individuals had about that evolution, a new
set of beliefs are assumed and the process is repeated. Individualsexpectations are rational
once this process converges and individual beliefs coincide with the resulting equilibrium
evolution.
The state of the economy is a pair, (Zt; t) ; where t is a measure dened over
S =(AZ W H) ;
where A = f1; 2; :::Ag is the set of ages, where Z is the set of all possible idiosyncratic shocks,
whereW is the set of all possible beginning-of-period nancial wealth realizations, and where
H is the set of all possible beginning-of-period housing wealth realizations. That is, t is a
distribution of agents across ages, idiosyncratic shocks, nancial, and housing wealth. Given
a nite dimensional vector to approximate t, and a vector of individual state variables
it = (Z
i
t ;W
i
t ; H
i
t);
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the individuals problem is solved using dynamic programming.
An important step in the numerical strategy is approximating the joint distribution of
individuals, t, with a nite dimensional object. The resulting approximation, or bounded
rationality equilibrium has been used elsewhere to solve overlapping generations models
with heterogenous agents and aggregate risk, including Krusell and Smith (1998); Ríos-Rull
and Sánchez-Marcos (2006); Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007); Gomes and Michaelides
(2008); Favilukis (2008), among others. For our application, we approximate this space with
a vector of aggregate state variables given by
AGt = (Zt; Kt; St; Ht; p
H
t ; qt);
where
Kt = KC;t +KH;t
and
St =
KC;t
KC;t +KH;t
:
The state variables are the observable aggregate technology shocks, the rst moment of the
aggregate capital stock, the share of aggregate capital used in production of the consumption
good, the aggregate stock of housing, and the relative house price and bond price, respec-
tively. The bond and the house price are natural state variables because the joint distribution
of all individuals only matters for the individuals problem in so far as it a¤ects asset prices.
Note that knowledge of Kt and St is tantamount to knowledge of KC;t and KH;t separately,
and vice versa (KC;t = KtSt; KH;t = Kt(1  St)).
Because of the large number of state variables and because the problem requires that
prices in two asset markets (housing and bond) must be determined by clearing markets every
period, the proposed problem is highly numerically intensive. To make the problem tractable,
we obviate the need to solve the dynamic programming problem of rms numerically by
instead solving analytically for a recursive solution to value function taking the form V (Kt) =
QtKt, where Qt (Tobins q) is a recursive function. We discuss this below.
In order to solve the individuals dynamic programming problem, the individual must
know AGt+1 and 
i
t+1 as a function of 
AG
t and 
i
t and aggregate shocks Zt+1. Here we show
that this can be achieved by specifying individualsbeliefs for the laws of motion of four
quantities:
A1 Kt+1,
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A2 pHt+1,
A3 qt+1, and
A4 [t+1t+1
t
(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)]; where QC;t+1  VC;t+1=KC;t+1 and analogously for QH;t+1.
Let t+1t+1
t
 Mt+1: The beliefs are approximated by a linear function of the aggregate
state variables as follows:
{t+1 = A(n) (Zt; Zt+1) e{t; (26)
where A(n) (Zt; Zt+1) is a 45 matrix that depends on the aggregate shocks Zt; and Zt+1and
where
{t+1 

Kt+1; p
H
t+1; qt+1; [Mt+1(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)]
0
;e{t  Kt; pHt ; qt; St; Ht0 :
We initialize the law of motion (26) with a guess for the matrix A(n) (Zt; Zt+1), given by
A(0) (Zt; Zt+1) : The initial guess is updated in an iterative procedure (described below) to
insure that individualsbeliefs are consistent with the resulting equilibrium.
Given (26), individuals can form expectations of AGt+1 and 
i
t+1 as a function of 
AG
t and
it and aggregate shocks Zt+1. To see this, we employ the following equilibrium relation (as
shown below) linking the investment-capital ratios of the two production sectors:
IH;t
KH;t
=
IC;t
KC;t
+
1
2'
Et [Mt+1(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)] : (27)
Moreover, note that Et [Mt+1(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)] can be computed from (26) by integrating
the 4th equation over the possible values of Zt+1 given e{t and Zt:
Equation (27) is derived by noting that the consumption rm solves a problem taking
the form
V (KC;t) = max
IC;t;NC;t
ZC;tK

CtN
1 
C;t   wtNC;t   IC;t   '

IC;t
KC;t
  
2
+ Et [Mt+1V (KC;t+1)] :
The rst-order condition for optimal labor choice implies NC;t =

ZC;t(1 )
wt
1=
KC;t: Substi-
tuting this expression into V (KC;t), the optimization problem may be written
V (KC;t) = max
It
XC;tKC;t   IC;t   '

IC;t
KC;t
  
2
KC;t + Et [Mt+1V (KC;t+1)](28)
s:t: KC;t+1 = (1  )KC;t + IC;t
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where
XC;t  

ZC;t
wt
(1  )
(1 )=
ZC;t
is a function of aggregate variables over which the rm has no control.
The housing rms solves
V (KH;t) = max
IH;t;NH;t
pHt ZH;t (Lt)1 
 
KH;tN
1 
H;t
   wtNH;t   IH;t   pLt Lt
 '

IH;t
KH;t
  
2
+ Et [Mt+1V (KH;t+1)] : (29)
The rst-order conditions for optimal labor and land/permits choice for the housing rm
imply that NH;t = kNKH;t, Lt = kLKH;t; where
kN =

k1k
1 
2
1=
kL =

k
(1 )
1 k
1 (1 )
2
1=
k1 = p
H
t ZH;t (1  ) =wt
k2 = p
H
t ZH;t (1  ) =pLt :
Substituting this expression into V (KH;t), the optimization problem may be written
V (KH;t) = max
It
XHtKH;t   IH;t   '

IH;t
KH;t
  
2
KH;t + Et [Mt+1V (KH;t+1)](30)
s:t: KH;t+1 = (1  )KH;t + IH;t
where
XH;t = p
H
t ZH;tk
(1 )
N k
1 
L :
Let s index the sector as either consumption, C, or housing, H:We now guess and verify
that for each rm, V (Ks;t+1) ; for s = C;H takes the form
V (Ks;t+1) = Qs;t+1Ks;t+1; s = C;H (31)
where Qs;t+1 depends on aggregate state variables but is not a function of the rms capital
stock Ks;t+1 or investment Is;t. Plugging (31) into (28) we obtain
V (Ks;t) = max
It
Xs;tKs;t It '

Is;t
Ks;t
  
2
Ks;t+Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1] [(1  )Ks;t + Is;t] : (32)
The rst-order conditions for the maximization (32) imply
Is;t
Ks;t
=  +
Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'
: (33)
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Substituting (33) into (32) we verify that V (Ks;t) takes the form Qs;tKs;t:
V (Ks;t)  Qs;tKs;t = Xs;tKs;t  

 +
Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'

Ks;t   '

Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'
2
Ks;t
+(1  ) (Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1])Ks;t + Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]

 +
Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'

Ks;t:
Rearranging terms, it can be shown that Qs;t is a recursion:
Qs;t = Xs;t + (1  ) + 2'

Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'

+ '

Et [Mt+1Qs;t+1]  1
2'
2
: (34)
Since Qs;t is a function only of Xs;t and the expected discounted value of Qs;t+1, it does not
depend on the rms own Ks;t+1 or Is;t. Hence we verify that V (Ks;t) = Qs;tKs;t. Although
Qs;t does not depend on the rms individual Ks;t+1 or Is;t, in equilibrium it will be related
to the rms investment-capital ratio via:
Qs;t = Xs;t + (1  )

1 + 2'

Is;t
Ks;t
  

+ '

Is;t
Ks;t
2
  2'

Is;t
Ks;t

; (35)
as can be veried by plugging (33) into (34). Note that (33) holds for the two representative
rms of each sector, i.e., QC;t and QH;t, thus we obtain (27) above.
With (35), it is straightforward to show how individuals can form expectations of AGt+1
and it+1 as a function of 
AG
t and 
i
t and aggregate shocks Zt+1. Given a grid of values for
Kt and St individuals can solve for KC;t and KH;t from KC;t = KtSt and KH;t = Kt (1  St).
Combining this with beliefs about Kt+1 from (26), individuals can solve for It  IC;t + IH;t
from Kt+1 = (1  )Kt+It. Given It and beliefs about
h
kt+k
t
(QC;t+1  QH;t+1)
i
from (26),
individuals can solve for IC;t and IH;t from (27). Given IH;t and the accumulation equation
KH;t+1 = (1  )KH;t+IH;t; individuals can solve for KH;t+1: Given IC;t individuals can solve
for KC;t+1 using the accumulation equation KC;t+1 = (1  )KC;t + IC;t: Using KH;t+1 and
KC;t+1, individuals can solve for St+1: Given a grid of values for Ht, Ht+1 can be computed
from Ht+1 = (1  H)Ht + YH;t; where YH;t = ZH;t (Lt)1 
 
KH;tN
1 
H;t

is obtained from
knowledge of ZH;t; KH;t (observable today), from the equilibrium condition Lt = L, and by
combining (18) and (20) to obtain the decomposition of Nt into NC;t and NH;t. Equation
(26) can be used directly to obtain beliefs about qt+1 and pHt+1.
To solve the dynamic programming problem individuals also need to know the equity
values VC;t and VH;t: But these come from knowledge of Qs;t (using (35)) and Ks;t via Vs;t =
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Qs;tKs;t for s = C;H: Values for dividends in each sector are computed from
DC;t = YC;t   IC;t   wtNC;t   C

IC;t
KC;t

KC;t;
DH;t = p
H
t YH;t   IH;t   pLt Lt   wtNH;t   H

IH;t
KH;t

KH;t
and from
wt = (1  )Zj;tKj;tN j;t = (1  ) (1  ) pHt ZH;tLtK(1 )H;t N (1 ) H;t
and by again combining (18) and (20) to obtain the decomposition of Nt into NC;t and NH;t:
Finally, the evolution of the aggregate technology shocks Zt+1 is given by the rst-order
Markov chain described above; hence agents can compute the possible values of Zt+1 as a
function of Zt.
Values for it+1 = (Z
i
t+1;W
i
t+1; H
i
t+1) are given from all of the above in combination with
the rst order Markov process for idiosyncratic income log
 
Zia;t

= log
 
Zia 1;t 1

+ ia;t: Note
that H it+1 is a choice variable, while W
i
t+1 = 
i
t(VC;t+1 + VH;t+1 + DC;t+1 + DH;t+1) + B
i
t+1
requires knowing Vs;t+1 = Qs;t+1Ks;t+1 and Ds;t+1, s = C;H conditional on Zt+1:These in
turn depend on Is;t+1, s = C;H and may be computed in the manner described above by
rolling forward one period both the equation for beliefs (26) and accumulation equations for
KC;t+1, and KH;t+1.
The individuals problem, as approximated above, may be summarized as follows (where
we drop age subscripts when no confusion arises):
Va;t
 
AGt ; 
i
t

= max
Hit+1;
i
t+1;B
i
t+1
U(Cit ; H
i
t) + iEt[Va+1;t+1
 
AGt+1; 
i
t+1

] s:t: (36)
The above problem is solved subject to (6), (7), (8), and (9) if the individual of working
age, and subject to the analogous versions of (6), (7), (8), and (9) (using pension income in
place of wage income), if the individual is retired. The problem is also solved subject to an
evolution equation for the state space:
AGt+1 =  
(n)(AGt ; Zt+1):
 (n) is the system of forecasting equations that is obtained by stacking all the beliefs from
(26) and accumulation equations into a single system. This dynamic programming problem
is quite complex numerically because of a large number of state variables but is otherwise
straightforward. Its implementation is described below.
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Next we simulate the economy for a large number of individuals using the policy functions
from the dynamic programming problem. The continuum of individuals born each period is
approximated by a number large enough to insure that the mean and volatility of aggregate
variables is not a¤ected by idiosyncratic shocks. We check this by simulating the model
for successively larger numbers of individuals in each age cohort and checking whether the
mean and volatility of aggregate variables changes. We have solved the model for several
di¤erent numbers of agents. For numbers ranging from a total of 2,400 to 40,000 agents in
the population we found no signicant di¤erences in the aggregate allocations.
An additional numerical complication is that two markets (the housing and bond market)
must clear each period. This makes pHt and qt convenient state variables: the individuals
policy functions are a response to a menu of prices pHt and qt, Given values for YH;t, H
i
a+1;t+1,
H ia;t, B
i
a;t and B
F
t form the simulation, and given the menu of prices p
H
t and qt and the
beliefs (26), we then choose values for pHt+1 and qt+1 that clear markets in t+ 1. The initial
allocations of wealth and housing are set arbitrarily to insure that prices in the initial period
of the simulation, pH1 and q1, clear markets. However, these values are not used since each
simulation includes an initial burn-in period of 150 years that we discard for the nal results.
Using data from the simulation, we calculate (A1)-(A4) as linear functions of e{t and
an initial guess A(0). In particular, for every Zt and Zt+1 combination we regress (A1)-
(A4) on Kt, St, Ht, pHt , and qt. This is used to calculate a new A
(n) = A(1) which is used
to re-solve for the entire equilibrium. We continue repeating this procedure, updating the
sequence

A(n)
	
; n = 0; 1; 2; ::: until (1) the coe¢ cients in A(n) between successive iterations
is arbitrarily small, (2) the regressions have high R2 statistics, and (3) the equilibrium is
invariant to the inclusion of additional state variables such as additional lags and/or higher
order moments of the cross-sectional wealth and housing distribution.
The R2 statistics for the four equations (A1)-(A4) are (.999, .999, .989, .998), respectively.
The lowest R2 is for the bond price equation. We found that successively increasing the
number of agents (beyond 2400) successively increases the R2 in the bond price equation,
without a¤ecting the equilibrium allocations or prices. However, we could not readily increase
the number of agents beyond 40,000 because attempts to do so exceeded the available memory
on a workstation computer. Our interpretation of this nding is that the equilibrium is
unlikely to be a¤ected by an approximation using more agents, even though doing so could
result in an improvement in the R2 of the bond equation. For this reason, and because
of the already high computational burden required to solve the model, we stopped at the
slightly lower level of accuracy for the bond forecasting regression as compared to the other
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forecasting regressions.
Numerical Solution to Individuals Dynamic Programming Problem
We now describe how the individuals dynamic programming problem is solved.
First we choose grids for the continuous variables in the state space. That is we pick
a set of values for W i, H i, K, H, S, pH , and q. Because of the large number of state
variables, it is necessary to limit the number of grid points for some of the state variables
given memory/storage limitations. We found that having a larger number of grid points for
the individual state variables was far more important than for the aggregate state variables,
in terms of the e¤ect it had on the resulting allocations. Thus we use a small number of grid
points for the aggregate state variables but compensate by judiciously choosing the grid point
locations after an extensive trial and error experimentation designed to use only those points
that lie in the immediate region where the state variables ultimately reside in the computed
equilibria. As such, a larger number of grid points for the aggregate state variables was found
to produce very similar results to those reported using only a small number of points. We
pick 25 points for W i, 12 points for H i, three points for K, H, S, pH , and four points for q.
The grid for W i starts at the borrowing constraint and ends far above the maximum wealth
reached in simulation. This grid is very dense around typical values of nancial wealth and
is sparser for high values. The housing grid is constructed in the same way.
Given the grids for the state variables, we solve the individuals problem by value function
iteration, starting for the oldest (age A) individual and solving backwards. The oldest
individuals value function for the period after death is zero for all levels of wealth and
housing (alternately it could correspond to an exogenously specied bequest motive). Hence
the value function in the nal period of life is given by VA = maxHit+1;it+1;Bit+1 U(C
i
A; H
i
A)
subject to the constraints above for (36). Given VA (calculated for every point on the
state space), we then use this function to solve the problem for a younger individual (aged
A   1). We continue iterating backwards until we have solved the youngest individuals
(age 1) problem. We use piecewise cubic splines (Fortran methods PCHIM and CHFEV) to
interpolate points on the value function. Any points that violate a constraint are assigned a
large negative value.
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Figure 1: Price-Rent Ratios in the Data
The figure compares three measures of the price-rent ratio. The first measure (“Flow of Funds”) is the ratio of residential real estate
wealth of the household sector from the Flow of Funds to aggregate housing services consumption from NIPA. The second measure
(“Freddie”) is the ratio of the Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index for purchases to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s
price index of shelter (which measures rent of renters and imputed rent of owners). The third series (“Case-Shiller”) is the ratio of the
Case-Shiller national house price index to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s price index of shelter. All indices are normalized to a value
of 100 in 2000.Q4. The data are quarterly from 1970.Q1 until 2008.Q4. The REITs series starts in 1972.Q4 and the Case-Shiller series
in 1987.Q1.
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Figure 2: Mortgage Closing Costs
The solid line shows the closing costs (initial fees an charges when closing on a mortgage) from the Federal Housing Financing Board’s
Monthly Interest Rate Survey. The costs are expressed as a percentage of the value of the loan balance, and averaged across mortgage
contracts. The data are monthly from January 1990 until December 2009.
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Figure 3: Fixed-rate Mortgage Rate and Ten-Year Constant Maturity Treasury Rate
The solid line plots the 30-year Fixed-Rate Mortgage rate (FRM); the dashed line plots the ten-year Constant Maturity Treasury Yield
(CMT). The FRM data are from Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey. They are average contract rates on conventional
conforming 30-year fixed-rate mortgages. The CMT yield data are from the St.-Louis Federal reserve Bank (FRED). The data are
monthly from April 1971.4 until February 2009.
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Figure 4: Foreign Holdings of US Treasuries
Panel A plots foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries. The solid line, measured against the right axis, plots foreign holdings of long-term
U.S. Treasury securities (T-notes, and T-bonds). It excludes (short-term) T-bills. The bars, measured against the left axis, plot those
same holdings as a percent of total marketable U.S. Treasuries. Marketable U.S. Treasuries are available from the Office of Public Debt,
and are measured as total marketable held by the public less T-bills. Panel B plots foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities (T-bills,
T-notes, and T-bonds) and the sum of U.S. treasuries and U.S. Agency debt (e.g., debt issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae), relative
to GDP. The first two series report only long-term debt holdings, while the other two series add in short-term debt holdings. Since no
short-term debt holdings are available before 2002, we assume that total holdings grow at the same rate as long-term holdings before
2002. The foreign holdings data from the Treasury International Capital System of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The foreign
holdings data are available for December 1974, 1978, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1997, March 2000, and annually for June 2002 through June
2008. Panel A also includes an observation for January 2009. Nominal GDP is from the National Income and Product Accounts, Table
1.1.5, line 1.
Panel A: Foreign Holdings of U.S. Treasuries Panel B: Foreign Holdings Relative to GDP
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Figure 5: Wealth by Age and Income in Model and Data
The figure plots net financial wealth (“Wealth”) by age in the left columns and housing wealth (“Housing”) by age in the right columns.
The top panels are for the Data, the middle panels for Model 1 (φ = 1), and the bottom panels for Model 2 (φ = 1). We use all 9
waves of the Survey of Consumer Finance (1983-2007, every 3 years). We construct housing wealth as the sum of primary housing and
other property. We construct net financial wealth as the sum of all other assets (bank accounts, bonds, IRA, stocks, mutual funds,
other financial wealth, private business wealth, and cars) minus all liabilities (credit card debt, home loans, mortgage on primary home,
mortgage on other properties, and other debt). We express wealth on a per capital basis by taking into account the household size,
using the Oxford equivalence scale for income. For each age between 22 and 81, we construct average net financial wealth and housing
wealth using the SCF weights. To make information in the different waves comparable to each other and to the model, we divide housing
wealth and net financial wealth in a given wave by average net worth (the sum of housing wealth and net financial wealth) across all
respondents for that wave. We do the same in the model. The Low Earner label refers to those in the bottom 25% of the income
distribution, where income is wage plus private business income. The Medium Earner group refers to the 25-75 percentile of the income
distribution, and the High Earner is the top 25%. The model computations are obtained from a 1,000 year simulation. The “Model
1” is the model with normal moving costs and collateral constraints, “Model 2” reports on the model with lower transaction costs and
looser collateral constraints. In particular, fixed transaction costs go from 3.2% of average consumption to 2.2%, variable costs go from
5.5% to 3.5% of home value, and the down-payment goes from 25% to 1%.
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Figure 6: Transition Dynamics in Model: Price-Rent Ratio and Price
The figure plots the house price pH , plotted against the left axis, and the price-rent ratio pH/R, plotted against the right axis for a
transition generated from the model. The path begins in the year 2000 in the stochastic steady state of Model 1, the model with tight
borrowing constraints and high transaction costs. In 2001, the world undergoes an unanticipated change to Model 3, the model with
looser borrowing constraints, lower transaction costs, and foreign holdings of U.S. bonds equal to 18% of GDP. The figure traces the first
6 years of the transition from the stochastic steady state of Model 1 to the stochastic steady state of Model 3. Along the transition path,
agents use the policy functions from Model 3 evaluated at state variables that begin at the stochastic steady state values of Model 1, and
gradually adjust to their stochastic steady state values of Model 3. Along the transition path, foreign holdings of U.S. bonds increase
linearly from 0% in 2000 to 18% of GDP by 2006, and remain constant thereafter. In 2007, the world unexpectedly changes to Model
4. Model 4 is the same as Model 1 but with foreign holdings of U.S. bonds equal to 18% of GDP, as in Model 3 (“Reversal of FML in
2007”). The transition path is drawn for a particular sequence of aggregate productivity shocks in the housing and non-housing sectors,
as explained in the text. Panel A is for the model without land/permits (φ = 1), while Panel B is for the model with land/permits
(φ = .9).
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Figure 7: Transition Dynamics in Model: Land/Permits Price (φ = .9)
The figure plots the price of land for a transition generated from the model. The path begins in the year 2000 in the stochastic steady
state of Model 1, the model with tight borrowing constraints and high transaction costs. In 2001, the world undergoes an unanticipated
change to Model 3, the model with looser borrowing constraints, lower transaction costs, and foreign holdings of U.S. bonds equal to
18% of GDP. The figure traces the first 6 years of the transition from the stochastic steady state of Model 1 to the stochastic steady
state of Model 3. Along the transition path, agents use the policy functions from Model 3 evaluated at state variables that begin at the
stochastic steady state values of Model 1, and gradually adjust to their stochastic steady state values of Model 3. Along the transition
path, foreign holdings of U.S. bonds increase linearly from 0% in 2000 to 18% of GDP by 2006, and remain constant thereafter. In 2007,
the world unexpectedly changes to Model 4. Model 4 is the same as Model 1 but with foreign holdings of U.S. bonds equal to 18% of
GDP, as in Model 3 (“Reversal of FML in 2007”). The transition path is drawn for a particular sequence of aggregate productivity
shocks in the housing and non-housing sectors, as explained in the text.
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Figure 8: Wealth Inequality in Model and Data
The figure plots the Gini coefficient of total wealth (left panel), financial wealth (middle panel), and housing wealth (right panel). In
each panel, the Gini in the data is measured against the left axis, while the Gini in the model is measured against the right axis. The
data are shown for the years 2001, 2004, and 2007, indicated by the solid line with dots. For the model, we report the steady state
Gini values in Models 1, 2 (star), and 3 (square). The model is the model without land (φ = 1). The right axes are chosen so that the
Model 1 Gini coincides with the value in Model 1. The data are from three waves of the Survey of Consumer Finance. We construct
housing wealth as the sum of primary housing and other property. We construct financial wealth as the sum of all other assets (bank
accounts, bonds, IRA, stocks, mutual funds, other financial wealth, private business wealth, and cars) minus all liabilities (credit card
debt, home loans, mortgage on primary home, mortgage on other properties, and other debt). We express wealth on a per capital basis
by taking into account the household size, using the Oxford equivalence scale for income. We use the SCF weights to calculate the Gini
coefficients. The “Model 1” is the model with normal moving costs and collateral constraints, “Model 2” reports on the model with
lower transaction costs and looser collateral constraints. In particular, fixed transaction costs go from 3.2% of average consumption to
2.2%, variable costs go from 5.5% to 3.5% of home value, and the down-payment goes from 25% to 1%. Finally, “Model 3” is the same
as Model 2 except with a positive demand for bonds from foreigners, equal to 18% of GDP.
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Table 1: Calibration
This table reports the parameter values of our model. The baseline “Model 1” is the model with normal moving costs and collateral
constraints, “Model 2” reports on the model with lower transaction costs and looser collateral constraints. In particular, fixed transaction
costs go from 3.2% of average consumption to 2.2%, variable costs go from 5.5% to 3.5% of home value, and the down-payment goes
from 25% to 1%. Finally, “Model 3” is the same as Model 2 except with a positive demand for bonds from foreigners, equal to 18% of
GDP. Our benchmark model is the model without land in the production function for housing (φ = 1), but we also consider a model
with a land share of 10% (φ = 0.9).
Parameter Description Baseline, Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Production
1 {φC (·) , φH (·)} adj. cost
{
ϕ
(
I
K − δ
)2
, ϕ
(
I
K − δ
)2}
2 δ deprec., KC ,KH 12% p.a.
3 δH depreciation, H 2.5% p.a.
4 α capital share, YC 0.36
5 ν capital share, YH 0.30
6 φ non-land share, YH {1,0.9}
Preferences
7 σ risk aversion 8
8 β time disc factor 0.923
9 ε elast of sub, C, H 1
10 χ weight on C 0.70
Demographics and Income
11 Ga age earnings profile SCF
12 πa+1|a survival prob mortality tables
13 σE st. dev ind earnings, E 0.0768
14 σR st. dev ind earnings, R 0.1298
Transactions Costs
15 F participation cost, K ≈ 1% C
i
16 ψ0 fixed trans cost, H ≈ 3.2% C
i
≈ 2.2% C
i
≈ 2.2% C
i
17 ψ1 variable trans cost, H ≈ 5.5% p
H
t H
i ≈ 3.5% pHt H
i ≈ 3.5% pHt H
i
18 ̟ collateral constr 25% 1% 1%
Foreign Supply
19 BF foreign capital 0 0 18% Y
Table 2: Real Business Cycle Moments
Panel A denotes business cycle statistics in annual post-war U.S. data (1953-2008). The data combine information from NIPA Tables
1.1.5, 3.9.5, and 2.3.5. Output (Y = YC+p
HYH+CH ) is gross domestic product minus net exports minus government expenditures. Total
consumption (CT ) is total private sector consumption (housing and non-housing). Housing consumption (CH = R∗H) is consumption
of housing services. Non-housing consumption (C) is total private sector consumption minus housing services. Housing investment
(pHYH) is residential investment. Non-housing investment (I) is the sum of private sector non-residential structures, equipment and
software, and changes in inventory. Total investment is denoted IT (residential and non-housing). For each series in the data, we first
deflate by the disposable personal income deflator, We then construct the trend with a Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter with parameter
λ = 100. Finally, we construct detrended data as the log difference between the raw data and the HP trend, multiplied by 100. The
standard deviation (first column), correlation with GDP (second column), and the first-order autocorrelation are all based on these
detrended series. The autocorrelation AC is a one-year correlation in data and model. The share of GDP (fourth column) is based on
the raw data. Panel B denotes the same statistics for the Model 1 with normal transaction costs and collateral constraints. Panel C
reports on Model 2 with lower transaction costs and looser collateral constraints. In particular, fixed transaction costs go from 3.2% of
average consumption to 2.2%, variable costs go from 5.5% to 3.5% of home value, and the down-payment goes from 25% to 1%. The
model is the benchmark model without land (φ = 1).
Panel A: Data (1953-2008)
st.dev. corr. w. GDP AC share of gdp
Y 2.78 1.00 0.46 1.00
CT 1.78 0.91 0.62 0.80
C 1.89 0.91 0.60 0.68
CH 1.64 0.62 0.74 0.12
IT 8.01 0.93 0.36 0.20
I 8.66 0.80 0.37 0.14
pHYH 12.77 0.71 0.49 0.06
Panel B: Model 1
st.dev. corr. w. GDP AC share of gdp
Y 2.77 1.00 0.14 1.00
CT 2.14 0.97 0.17 0.72
C 1.88 0.95 0.11 0.45
CH 2.95 0.87 0.31 0.27
IT 4.73 0.96 0.12 0.28
I 4.37 0.89 0.09 0.23
pHYH 14.87 0.51 0.13 0.05
Panel C: Model 2
st.dev. corr. w. GDP AC share of gdp
Y 2.71 1.00 0.12 1.00
CT 1.85 0.99 0.14 0.73
C 1.79 0.94 0.12 0.49
CH 2.30 0.92 0.12 0.25
IT 5.21 0.99 0.09 0.27
I 5.19 0.81 0.08 0.21
pHYH 13.83 0.61 0.15 0.06
Table 3: Correlations House Prices and Real Activity
The table reports the correlations between house prices pH and house price-rent ratios pH/R with GDP and the correlation of house
prices with residential investment pHYH . Panel A is for the data. The house price and price-rent ratio are measured three different
ways. In the first row (Data 1), the housing price is the aggregate value of residential real estate wealth in the fourth quarter of the
year (Flow of Funds). The price-rent ratio divides this housing wealth by the consumption of housing services summed over the four
quarters of the year (NIPA). In Data 2, the housing price is the repeat-sale Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage House Price index for
purchases only (Freddie Mac). The price-rent ratio divided this price by the rental price index for shelter (BLS). It assumes a price
rent ratio in 1970, equal to the one in Data 1. In Data 3, the housing price is the repeat-sale Case-Shiller National House Price index.
The price-rent ratio divided this price by the rental price index for shelter (BLS). It assumes a price rent ratio in 1987, equal to the
one in Data 1. The price and price-rent ratio values in a given year are the fourth quarter values. The annual price index, GDP, and
residential investment are first deflated by the disposable personal income price deflator and then expressed as log deviations from their
Hodrick-Prescott trend. Panels B and C are for the models without (φ = 1) and with land/permits (φ = 0.9). The “Model 1” is the
model with normal moving costs and collateral constraints, “Model 2” reports on the model with lower transaction costs and looser
collateral constraints. In particular, fixed transaction costs go from 3.2% of average consumption to 2.2%, variable costs go from 5.5%
to 3.5% of home value, and the down-payment goes from 25% to 1%. Finally, “Model 3” is the same as Model 2 except with a positive
demand for bonds from foreigners, equal to 18% of GDP.
Correlations (Y, pH) (pHYH , p
H) (Y, pH/R)
Panel A: Data
Data 1 (1953-2008) 0.23 0.43 0.23
Data 1 (1973-2008) 0.33 0.50 0.27
Data 2 (1973-2008) 0.33 0.52 0.29
Data 3 (1987-2008) 0.36 0.75 0.10
Panel B: φ = 1
Model 1 0.95 0.28 0.17
Model 2 0.91 0.28 0.62
Model 3 0.87 0.39 0.60
Panel C: φ = 0.9
Model 1 0.93 0.25 0.21
Model 2 0.92 0.17 0.49
Model 3 0.89 0.41 0.55
Table 4: Housing Wealth Relative to Total Wealth
The first column reports average housing wealth of the young (head of household is aged 35 or less) divided by average total wealth
(i.e., net worth) of the young. The second column reports average housing wealth of the old divided by average net worth of the old.
The third column reports average housing wealth of the young plus average housing wealth of the old divided by average net worth of
the young plus average net worth of the old. The fourth (fifth) [sixth]column reports average housing wealth of the low (medium) [high
]earners divided by average net worth of the low (medium) [high] earners. Low (medium) [high] earners are those in the bottom 25%
(middle 50%) [top 25%] of the income distribution, relative to the cross-sectional income distribution at each age. The data in Panel A
are from the Survey of Consumer Finance for 1998-2007. The last two rows report the model. In the model, housing wealth is PH ∗H
and total wealth is W + PH ∗H. Panels B and C are for the models without (φ = 1) and with land/permits (φ = 0.9). The “Model
1” is the model with normal moving costs and collateral constraints, “Model 2” reports on the model with lower transaction costs and
looser collateral constraints. In particular, fixed transaction costs go from 3.2% of average consumption to 2.2%, variable costs go from
5.5% to 3.5% of home value, and the down-payment goes from 25% to 1%. Finally, “Model 3” is the same as Model 2 except with a
positive demand for bonds from foreigners, equal to 15% of GDP.
young old all low earn medium earn high earn
Panel A: Data
1998 0.67 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.63 0.40
2001 0.67 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.58 0.40
2004 1.14 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.70 0.51
2007 0.92 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.71 0.50
Panel B: φ = 1
Model 1 1.50 0.48 0.52 0.44 0.49 0.56
Model 2 1.83 0.52 0.56 0.49 0.54 0.60
Model 3 1.78 0.54 0.59 0.50 0.56 0.64
Panel C: φ = .9
Model 1 1.50 0.47 0.50 0.42 0.48 0.55
Model 2 1.97 0.51 0.56 0.48 0.54 0.60
Model 3 1.85 0.52 0.57 0.48 0.54 0.62
Table 5: Return Moments
The table reports the mean and standard deviation of the return on physical capital, on a levered claim to physical capital, and on housing, as well as their Sharpe ratios. The
Sharpe ratios are defined as the average excess return, i.e., in excess of the riskfree rate, divided by the standard deviation of the excess return. It also reports the mean and
standard deviation of the riskfree rate. The last column is the change in the price-rent ratio, measured as the percentage change between 2000 and 2006 in the data and the
percentage change relative to Model 1 in the model. Panel A reports the data. The housing return and price-rent ratio are measured three different ways. In the first row (Data
1), the housing return is the aggregate value of residential real estate wealth in the fourth quarter of the year (Flow of Funds) plus the consumption of housing services summed
over the four quarters of the year (NIPA) divided by the value of residential real estate in the fourth quarter of the preceding year. We subtract CPI inflation to express the return
in real terms and population growth in order to correct for the growth in housing quantities due to population growth. In Data 2, the housing return uses the repeat-sale Freddie
Mac Conventional Mortgage House Price index for purchases only (Freddie Mac) and the rental price index for shelter (BLS). It assumes a price rent ratio in 1970, equal to the
one in Data 1. We subtract realized CPI inflation from realized housing returns to form monthly real housing returns. We construct annual real housing returns by compounding
monthly real housing returns over the year. The levered physical capital return in the data is measured as the CRSP value-weighted stock return. We subtract realized annual CPI
inflation from realized annual stock returns between 1953 and 2008 to form real annual stock returns. The risk-free rate is measured as the yield on a one-year government bond
at the start of the year minus the realized inflation rate over the course of the year. The data are from the Fama-Bliss data set and available from 1953 until 2008. Panels B and
C are for the models without (φ = 1) and with land/permits (φ = 0.9). The leverage ratio (debt divided by equity) we use in the model is 2/3: RE = Rf + (1+B/E)(RK −Rf ).
The “Model 1” is the model with normal moving costs and collateral constraints, “Model 2” reports on the model with lower transaction costs and looser collateral constraints.
In particular, fixed transaction costs go from 3.2% of average consumption to 2.2%, variable costs go from 5.5% to 3.5% of home value, and the down-payment goes from 25% to
1%. Finally, “Model 3” is the same as Model 2 except with a positive demand for bonds from foreigners, equal to 18% of GDP.
E[RK ] Std[RK ] E[RE ] Std[RE ] E[RH ] Std[RH ] E[Rf ] Std[Rf ] SR[RE ] SR[RH ] ∆p
H/R
Panel A: Data
Data 1 (53-08) 7.86 19.11 9.89 4.91 1.62 2.49 0.34 1.49 31.2%
Data 1 (72-08) 6.60 19.43 9.78 5.87 1.66 3.01 0.27 1.22 31.2%
Data 2 (72-08) 6.60 19.43 9.11 4.32 1.66 3.01 0.27 1.36 30.7%
Panel B: φ = 1
Model 1 4.02 6.49 5.62 11.40 13.02 6.20 1.63 3.50 0.31 1.52 −−
Model 2 5.71 7.88 7.15 13.86 10.42 6.71 3.56 4.31 0.23 0.80 23.4%
Model 3 4.66 8.72 7.82 15.41 9.90 7.84 0.00 4.92 0.44 1.01 31.0%
Panel C: φ = .9
Model 1 3.39 5.73 4.91 10.17 14.17 6.17 1.10 3.06 0.33 1.78 −−
Model 2 5.36 7.14 6.63 12.58 11.04 6.12 3.45 3.70 0.22 0.98 27.5%
Model 3 4.19 8.57 6.73 15.07 10.60 7.42 0.39 4.65 0.37 1.09 33.7%
Table 6: Predictability
Panel A reports the the coefficients, t-stats, and R2 of real return and real dividend growth predictability regressions. The return
regression specification is: 1
k
∑k
j=1 r
i
t+j = α+ κ
rpdit + εt+k, where k is the horizon in years, r
i is the log housing return (left panel) or
log stock return (right panel), and pdit is the log price-rent ratio (left panel) or price-dividend ratio on equity (right panel). The dividend
growth predictability specification is similar: 1
k
∑k
j=1 ∆d
i
t+j = α + κ
dpdit + εt+k, where ∆d
i is the log rental growth rate (left panel)
or log dividend growth rate on equity (right panel). Panel B reports the the coefficients, t-stats, and R2 of excess return predictability
regressions. The return regression specification is: 1
k
∑k
j=1 r
i,e
t+j = α+κ
r,epdit + εt+k, where k is the horizon in years, r
i,e is the log real
housing return in excess of a real short-term bond yield (left panel) or the log real stock return in excess of a real short-term bond yield
(right panel), and pdit is the log price-rent ratio (left panel) or price-dividend ratio on equity (right panel). In the model, we use the
return on physical capital for the real return on equity and the return on the one-year bond as the real bond yield. The model objects
are obtained from a 1150-year simulation, where the first 150 periods are discarded as burn-in. The model is the benchmark Model 1
without land/permits (φ = 1). In the data, we use the CRSP value-weighted stock return, annual data for 1953-2008. The housing
return in the data is based on the annual Flow of Funds data for 1953-2008. We subtract CPI inflation to obtain the real returns and
real dividend or rental growth rates. The real bond yield is the 1-year Fama-Bliss yield in excess of CPI inflation.
Panel A: Raw Returns and Dividends/Rents
Housing - Model Equity - Model
k κr t-stat R2 κd t-stat R2 k κr t-stat R2 κd t-stat R2
1 −0.26 −16.72 13.46 −0.06 −5.75 1.83 1 −0.14 −18.18 25.46 0.48 19.45 29.22
2 −0.20 −20.60 24.75 −0.04 −4.44 1.67 2 −0.09 −20.03 33.96 0.30 20.84 37.36
3 −0.17 −24.50 35.86 −0.02 −3.30 1.21 3 −0.06 −20.75 36.37 0.22 22.71 41.84
5 −0.13 −30.55 54.36 −0.01 −1.70 0.48 5 −0.04 −23.59 38.48 0.13 24.32 44.13
10 −0.09 −34.72 71.45 −0.00 −0.31 0.02 10 −0.02 −24.67 47.25 0.07 27.03 50.76
20 −0.05 −29.51 75.83 0.00 0.79 0.19 20 −0.01 −27.51 53.91 0.04 34.14 58.06
30 −0.03 −29.52 75.43 0.00 1.18 0.40 30 −0.01 −24.52 57.90 0.02 34.67 65.26
Housing - Data Equity - Data
k κr t-stat R2 κd t-stat R2 k κr t-stat R2 κd t-stat R2
1 -0.12 -2.2 5.3 0.00 -0.1 0.0 1 -0.14 -2.4 9.3 -0.07 -2.9 4.6
2 -0.12 -3.0 8.1 0.00 0.1 0.0 2 -0.12 -2.4 13.3 -0.03 -1.9 3.5
3 -0.11 -4.3 9.4 0.01 1.0 0.4 3 -0.09 -3.1 14.4 -0.01 -0.6 0.4
5 -0.09 -5.4 11.7 0.03 2.4 4.0 5 -0.07 -4.2 16.0 0.01 0.7 0.7
Panel B: Excess Returns
Housing - Model Equity - Model
k κr,e t-stat R2 k κr,e t-stat R2
1 −0.16 −5.76 2.63 1 −0.09 −7.90 6.03
2 −0.12 −5.61 4.27 2 −0.06 −6.75 6.25
3 −0.10 −5.72 5.98 3 −0.04 −5.64 5.02
5 −0.08 −5.97 9.16 5 −0.02 −3.74 2.38
10 −0.06 −6.33 14.94 10 −0.01 −1.96 1.00
20 −0.04 −6.77 20.52 20 −0.00 −0.67 0.15
30 −0.02 −6.90 21.99 30 −0.00 −0.86 0.29
Housing - Data Equity - Data
k κr,e t-stat R2 k κr,e t-stat R2
1 -0.15 -1.8 7.8 1 -0.16 -2.4 11.7
2 -0.15 -2.0 11.4 2 -0.11 -2.4 12.9
3 -0.15 -2.7 14.0 3 -0.08 -3.3 13.1
5 -0.16 -4.6 20.8 5 -0.06 -3.4 14.6
Table 7: Risk Sharing
This table reports various measures of cross-sectional risk sharing: the cross-sectional standard deviation of the consumption share
Ci
T,a,t
/CT,t, the cross-sectional standard deviation of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, the Gini coefficient of consumption,
and the variance of log consumption. The first two measures are reported for all ages, as well as for various age groups. All numbers are
multiplied by 100. Panel A is for the model without land/permits (φ = 1), while Panel B is for the model with land/permits (φ = 0.9).
We simulate the model for N = 2400 households and for T = 1150 periods (the first 150 years are burn-in and discarded). We calculate
cross-sectional means and standard deviations of individual consumption share or consumption growth within each age group for each
period, and then average over periods. The “Model 1” is the model with normal moving costs and collateral constraints, “Model 2”
reports on the model with lower transaction costs and looser collateral constraints. In particular, fixed transaction costs go from 3.2% of
average consumption to 2.2%, variable costs go from 5.5% to 3.5% of home value, and the down-payment goes from 25% to 1%. Finally,
“Model 3” is the model with foreign holdings of bonds to the extent of 19% of GDP.
Panel A: φ = 1
Cross-sectional St. Dev. Consumption Share Gini cons.
all ≤ 35 36-50 51-65 >65
Model 1 79.63 49.44 55.74 70.72 81.56 37.63
Model 2 77.30 47.86 54.08 68.38 76.82 36.42
Model 3 78.33 49.01 55.33 69.69 79.66 36.73
Cross-sectional St. Dev. IMRS Var of log cons.
all ≤ 35 36-50 51-65 >65
Model 1 60.35 64.88 57.90 66.43 33.08 45.05
Model 2 55.14 62.96 54.89 55.80 28.35 42.37
Model 3 62.50 68.75 60.63 65.42 35.71 42.81
Panel B: φ = 0.9
Cross-sectional St. Dev. Consumption Share Gini cons.
all ≤ 35 36-50 51-65 >65
Model 1 78.68 49.75 55.51 70.43 80.14 37.44
Model 2 75.72 48.66 54.51 68.26 75.50 36.34
Model 3 79.50 50.05 56.44 72.11 82.28 37.31
Cross-sectional St. Dev. IMRS Var of log cons.
all ≤ 35 36-50 51-65 >65
Model 1 59.46 62.23 57.48 67.65 31.84 44.65
Model 2 54.65 60.83 55.37 56.50 28.22 42.30
Model 3 62.64 68.86 62.55 66.86 34.81 44.26
